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I. THE WATER LAW SYSTEM-

AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

The development and use of water resources in Connecticut occurs
within a rather complex institutional framework. In the absence of a
statutory definition of water rights the courts have relied on common
law principles in defining property rights in water. Common-law water
rights coexist with, and are limited by, numerous statutory laws
pertaining to various aspects of water use.
In defining private rights to use water from a water course,
Connecticut courts have relied on the riparian rights doctrine. 1
"Broadly stated, a riparian right has come to represent a property
right arising from ownership of land adjoining a water course. It is
inseparably annexed to the soil. A riparian right includes the right
to make any reasonable use of water relating to riparian lands with due
regard to the rights of upper and lower riparians in their use of the
water."2

Much of the common law regarding riparian rights was developed in
settling conflicts over rights to detain water for power production.
From the early grist mills until the middle 1800's water power sites
were the prime determinants of industrial location and growth. To
encourage water power development the Connecticut General Assembly
granted limited condemnation power to persons wishing to build a mill
pond and ditch system. 3 These statutes also protected existing mills
1
There have been two major legal studies of Connecticut water
rights law.
Clyde 0. Fisher, Jr., "Connecticut Law of Water Rights,"
Appendix A, of Water Resources of Connecticut, Report to the
General Assembly, by the Water Resources Commission (a special
commission created by Special Act No. 572, 1955, State of
Connecticut, 1957, pp. A1-70).
Robert I. Reis, Connecticut Water Law: Judicial Allocation of
Water Resources (Institute of Water Resources, University oT
Connecticut, Storrs, 1967, 215 pp.).
For convenience reference will be made only to Reis for information contained in both studies.
2

Reis, op.

cit., p. 21.

3
These early grants of authority continue in the statutes.
Connecticut General Statutes (Rev. 1958), Sec. 52-446 through 52-455.

and mill sites from condemnation. However, the scheduling of
detentions and flow releases was left to the mill owners. Civil suits
resulted when mill owners could not agree on the scheduling of
releases.1
Currently conflicts exist along some rivers between recreational
users and companies generating hydroelectric power. 2 Hydroelectric
stations are usually operated only during hours of peak demand for
electricity. Stream flow is detained and then released rapidly for a
few hours per day. On weekends and holidays power demands are usually
less than average; thus, little water is released if storage capacity
is available. The resulting fluctuations in downstream flow limit
recreational uses both directly and through intensification of
pollution problems.
A diversion of stream flow for public water supply purposes does
not qualify as a riparian use in Connecticut. 3 Public water supplies
are developed under legislative grants of authority to purchase or
condemn necessary water rights. 4 Injured riparian proprietors can
demand compensation but cannot prevent a diversion for public water
supply purposes.
New legislative restrictions on the development of public water
supplies were established in 1967 by Public Act No. 792. 5 Any person,
corporation, or municipality receiving authority to divert water from
a river for public use by special act after January 1, 1967, must also
obtain a permit from the Water Resources Commission. Public interest

1

Numerous cases are cited by Reis, op. cit., pp. 36-43.

2
In fairness to the power companies recognition must be given to
the considerable recreational use of power company reservoirs.
Reis, op. cit., p. 54.
The allocative aspects of these grants of authority will be
discussed in several sections of this report. For a legal summary on
the relationship between municipal water supplies and riparian rights
see: Reis, op. cit., pp. 53-69.
5
"An Act Concerning Use of Water from Rivers for Public
Consumption" (Connecticut Public Act No. 792, 1967 General Session).
A reprint of the Act is provided in Appendix B of this report.
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in other water uses must be considered in determining whether or not
to issue a permit. 1
Of the total water withdrawn in Connecticut, only a small
percentage is lost through consumptive uses. Industries withdrawing
large volumes for washing, processing, and cooling typically discharge
waste water into the same stream. Interbasin diversions are primarily
for public water supply. Thus, laws pertaining to pollution control
and development of public water supplies have a direct and often
dominant influence on the allocation and use of water resources. An
economic evaluation of the "water law system" must, therefore, include
the allocative aspects of these statutory laws in conjunction with
water rights as traditionally defined.
A.

Resource Allocation through Pollution Control Laws

No state legislature or court has clearly defined water rights
with regard to quality. While there have been a number of successful
civil suits to enjoin continued pollution and obtain compensation for
damages, these actions to protect property rights have not been
generally effective in controlling pollution. Legal uncertainties,
the time and expense of litigation, and the diffusion of damages and
sources of pollution appear to protect waste dischargers from civil
suits.
Progress in water pollution control is being made through federal
and state financial assistance and through state pollution control
regulations based on police power - the authority of states to regulate
the use of property in the interest of public safety and general
welfare. 2 These regulations result in an administrative allocation of
the use of water for waste disposal.

1

From an economic point of view,

Ibid., Section 2.

2
In Connecticut, The Water Resources Commission is responsible for
water pollution control beyond that required to protect public health.
The organization, powers and responsibilities of the Commission are
defined in Section 25 of the Connecticut General Statutes (Rev. 1958).
The powers of the Commission regarding pollution control were
significantly strengthened by Public Act No. 57, "An Act Concerning
the Elimination of Pollution of the Waters of the State" (Connecticut
Public Act No. 57, 1967, General Session).
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a permit to discharge liquid wastes can be very similar to a right to
divert water.
B.

Public Interest in Stream Flow

Legal differences exist between public and private water courses.
A water course is public if it is either commercially navigable or
affected by tidal ebb and flow. In Connecticut a public water course
is legally characterized by state ownership of subaqueous lands and
public rights of passage. In the case of a private or non-navigable
water course the bed is privately owned, and within reasonable limits
the stream flow may be diverted or detained. 1
Expanding state and federal activities in water resource
development and management appear to be reducing the practical
significance of legal differences between public and private water
courses. The federal government has built numerous flood control
projects on non-navigable tributaries of navigable streams. Detentions
of flood flow seldom involve important questions pertaining to water
rights. However, plans to store water for low-flow augmentation
introduce new issues.
1.

Water quality management

Federal agencies involved in river basin and reservoir planning
are now required to consider the inclusion of storage for regulation of
stream flow to assist in water quality protection.2 The value of such
storage is included in determining the economic value of the entire
project. If the benefits from the water quality control features are
widespread the costs of such features are non-reimbursable.
Plans to regulate stream flow raise several questions pertaining
to private water rights. Will detention from flows smaller than flood

1

Reis, pp. cit., p. 17.

2
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Public Law 84-660, as amended
by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961 - (PL 8788), the Water Quality Act of 1965 - (PL 89-234), and the Clean Water
Restoration Act of 1966 - (PL 89-753) and Oil Pollution Act 1924, as
amended by the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 - (PL 89-753),
compiled by Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, U. S.
Department of Interior (U. S. Printing Office: 1967 0-243-126), Section
3 (b) of PL 84-660, p. 2.
- 4 -

stage interfere with established water rights?

How can releases for
water quality improvements be protected from downstream detention or
diversion from the basin? The preceding questions will be considered
in subsequent sections of this report. The issue was raised at this
point to illustrate public interest in stream flow and water rights.
The Federal Water Quality Act of 1965 requires establishment of
water quality standards for all interstate waters (including coastal
-aters). 1 Moreover, the discharge of waste into tributaries which
reach interstate waters are subject to abatement under the Act. 2 The
legislation also specifies that failure of a state to set acceptable
standards and develop an acceptable plan for enforcement will result
in direct action by the Secretary of the Interior.
Previous to 1965 the Connecticut Water Resources Commission
concentrated attention on control of individual waste discharges.
Relatively little attention was given to the setting of instream
quality standards (often referred to as stream classification). Since
stream standards are of little direct value in reducing waste discharges,
the federal emphasis on standards may be excessive. However, the
standards do provide the basis for clear public statements regarding objectives and the future use of specific waters. Emphasis on standards
also encourages state pollution control agencies to give increased
attention to future stream flow and consequently to water rights and
the development of public water supplies. Future detentions and
diversions which reduce stream flow must be considered when setting
quality standards and preparing plans for achieving the standards.
2.

Recreational uses and scenic values

In addition to its owning the land under public waters, the State
provides public boat launching facilities on coastal waters and on many
inland lakes. The State Board of Fisheries and Game has purchased
public access rights for fishing along numerous streams. These State

1
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, op. cit., Sec. 10 and 13 (e)
pp. 15 and 22.
2

Ibid., Sec. 10 (c) (5), pp.

3

Ibid., Sec. 10 (c) (2), p. 15.

16 and 17.
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property rights have not been the basis of action to secure pollution
abatement or to limit detentions or diversions of stream flow. However, the public use of these areas has surely been considered in
establishing priorities in pollution control. Public recreational
uses are recognized in Public Act No. 792, which instructs the Water
Resources Commission to consult with the State Board of Fisheries and
Game and to hold a public hearing in determining whether or not to
grant a permit for diversion of river water for public water supply.
Detentions, diversions and waste discharges reduce scenic values
and recreational uses on both public and private property. Are these
non-commercial uses effectively represented in the existing decision
process? If not, how can protection of environmental uses be strengthened? Can property rights be redefined to reflect the increasing
concern over non-commercial uses? Can diversions and detentions be
limited through regulations similar to existing pollution control laws?
These questions extend beyond the scope of an economic analysis. Part
of the results of this study will consist of the identification of
specific questions for future legal research.
II.

ECONOMIC CRITERIA

There are two basic elements to be considered in an economic
evaluation of water law. First, the use of water resources depends to
a large degree on the incidence of costs and benefits resulting from
particular uses. To the extent possible, rights and regulations should
structure the decision process in such a way that consideration is
given to all costs and benefits associated with all potential water
uses. The incidence of benefits and costs should provide economic
incentives for research directed toward a reduction in consumptive use
and waste creation, and toward improved waste treatment techniques.
Second, rights and regulations should be sufficiently stable to
encourage investment and yet provide for a reallocation of resource use
through time. Both of these basic criteria must be considered for the
entire water law system.

- 6 -

A.

External Costs

Efficient utilization of water resources is possible only if

all

costs and benefits associated with each water use are considered in the
decision process. The market mechanism fails to provide this coordination of benefits and costs if the actions of one decision unit (person,
firm, or municipality) result in direct (non-market) transfers of costs
or benefits to others.
Direct transfers of benefits are often referred to as "real
external economies" or "technological external economies." l A process
which results in benefits to downstream users will be conducted at less
than the socially optimum rate if there is neither compensation from
the beneficiaries nor some form of public subsidy. Practical examples
exist but are not numerous. The discharge of plant nutrients could
benefit downstream irrigators. However, the discharge of plant
nutrients should be encouraged only if an increased contribution would
result in a net of external benefits. Seasonal storage of stream flow
for hydroelectric generation benefits downstream power stations. Since
all parties can benefit from cooperation important external economies
are often internalized through mergers or contracts. Public subsidy is
needed only if the benefits are too diffused for private initiative.
In the case of real external diseconomies there is, unfortunately,
no inherent tendency toward correction. 2 Water pollution has long been

Within the context of equilibrium theory, real external economies
result in a less than optimum allocation of resources. Within the
context of economic growth theory, particularly as applied to the less
developed countries, dynamic external economies can stimulate economic
growth. See: Tibor Scitovsky, "Two Concepts of External Economies,"
The Journal of Political Economy (Volume LXII, No. 2), April 1954,
pp. 143-151.
A real technological external diseconomy must be distinguished
2
from a "pecuniary external diseconomy," which is created when increased
production by one firm results in an increase in the price of inputs
for other firms. A pecuniary external diseconomy transfers income but
does not circumvent the market or distort the allocation of resources.
See: William J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State
with a New Introduction - Welfare and the State RevisitedTHarvard
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, second edition, 1965,
212 pp.), p. 25.
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a classic example of a real external diseconomy (external cost).
Discharge of waste into a stream results in increased water treatment
costs, losses in satisfaction for recreational users and nearby residents, and loss of opportunities for developing new uses. Unless the
injured parties can procure compensation from the waste discharger the
costs of the waste discharge are external to the waste discharger and
to the entire market mechanism. There is no economic incentive to
consider downstream costs when selecting plant locations and production
External costs are also created by
processes or to treat wastes.
detentions and diversions of stream flow if downstream costs are
incident on persons unable to procure compensation.
Altering the decision structure to eliminate external costs
improves the efficiency of resource allocation, and in theory gainers
could compensate losers in such a way that at least one individual
would be better off and none worse off than before the change. 1 In
practice all losers cannot be compensated. Altering the definition of
property rights or expanding the scope of public regulation over the use
of property will entail uncompensated losses for some individuals. Thus,
policy decisions must include value judgments made through the political
process in conjunction with economic and technical considerations.
1.

Clarification of property rights

In some situations external costs can be eliminated or at least
reduced through a more specific definition of individual property
rights. Where rights to all potential uses can be quantitatively
defined and exchanged through a market process there are no external
costs. Where consumptive uses compete for limited supplies there are
clear opportunities for rationing through the market.
There is little practical opportunity for reducing external costs
from waste discharges through a definition of pollution rights.
External costs would continue to exist even in the absence of potential

1
At least one gainer and no loser is the basic idea of the well
known Pareto criterion for identifying an increase in welfare. For
additional discussion of the Pareto criterion in relation to water
policy see: S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, "Concepts Used as Economic Criteria
for a System of Water Rights," Land Economics (Volume 32, No. 4),
November 1956 (pp. 295-312), pp706-309.
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recreational uses and scenic values. With several water uses along
a stream, a cooperative hoarding of discharge rights to maintain or
improve water quality would require individuals to support the
cooperative effort in the face of an individual incentive to wait for
others to hoard the rights for the benefit of all uses.
Opportunities for protecting recreational and scenic uses through
the market process appear to be very limited. Except for commercial
recreation enterprises these instream uses and values are dispersed
over too many users for effective representation through private
property rights.
Benefits and costs which cannot be effectively expressed in the
market should be represented through some form of public control.
However, a simple statement that all benefits and costs should be
considered is not an adequate basis for a practical evaluation of
existing water law. A norm, or at least a perspective on expectations,
must be established. The nature of costs resulting from diminished
quality and flow must be investigated. Practical methods of bringing
existing external costs into the decision structure must be identified.
2.

Role of optimization models

Detailed economic models have been developed in an attempt to
define the conditions necessary for minimizing all costs associated
with liquid waste disposal in a region (usually defined as a watershed).
More specifically, the objective is to state the conditions necessary
for minimizing the sum of abatement costs and damage costs. Within
rather stringent assumptions this can be accomplished by reducing waste
discharges (through treatment and industrial process alteration) up to
the point where additional abatement would be more expensive than the
value of the downstream damage avoided. Kneese has defined conditions
under which this equalizing of marginal costs and benefits from
abatement at each outfall could be accomplished through effluent
charges, incentive payments, or direct regulation of discharges.

1
Allen V. Kneese, The Economics of Regional Water Quality
Management (published for Resources for the Future, Inc., by the Johns
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1964, 215 pp.). These models and subsequent
developments are summarized in Appendix A, Regional Water Quality
Optimization Models of this report.
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Under the incentive payments proposal, a public agency would stand
ready to pay current and potential waste contributors to restrict waste
discharges. The schedule of payments offered would be based on the
incremental damage costs.

The amount paid would be determined by the
rate from the schedule times the amount of waste reduction in response
to the payment. Estimating the reduction would be extremely difficult
since there is no practical way of estimating the quantity of waste
which would have been discharged in the absence of the payment system.
An effluent charge system would be less complex, since the charge
would be determined by the amount actually discharged, in conjunction
with the incremental damage costs. While the conditions for an exact
social optimum are stringent even in theory, an approximation could be
achieved if the damage costs can be estimated.
In the effluent standard proposal, the controlling agency would
have to estimate both the marginal costs of abatement for each waste
contributor and the associated marginal damage costs. Since estimating
abatement costs would be the less difficult of the two, implementation
would depend on success in estimating damage costs.
The literature on regional water quality optimization models gives
little or no attention to external costs resulting from diversions and
detentions of flow. At least in theory the models can be easily expanded.

An optimum set of diversion and detention charges or standards
would be analogous to the respective effluent charges or standards. The
key to implementation would be estimating the costs
satisfaction) resulting from incremental reductions
The costs of incremental waste discharges and
could be reasonably well estimated in the case of a

(including losses in
in flow.
reductions in flow
stream with a few
commercial users and no significant potential for recreational uses. In
this situation court proceedings could be utilized to protect property
rights and thereby eliminate external costs. However, time and expense
could probably be saved and efficiency of management improved through a
An agency coordinating a limited number of commercial
uses could make rather direct application of the optimization models
using either charges or standards.
regional agency.

1

For additional discussion of these difficulties see Appendix A.
- 10 -

For the State as a whole, or even for a sizeable river basin within
the State, there is no conceivable means of estimating the costs of
incremental waste discharges or reductions in flow.

The effect on down-

stream users of discharging an additional unit of a particular waste at
a point along a stream depends on flow, temperature, the amounts and
locations of other waste discharge, and the condition of the streambed.
Thus, the optimization models do not provide a workable pattern for
State water resource policy and programs.
There are conceptual as well as practical limitations in attempting
to develop public policy on the basis of an optimization model. Neither
economics nor political science has produced a generally accepted
formula or procedure for aggregating individual welfare functions into
a social welfare function or objective.
Moreover, institutional structures are operational parts of the decision process when forming public
policy. In a direct application of optimization techniques, institutional structures are entered as constraints along with known technology
2
and resource availability.
Thus, direct applications are limited to
private decisions and to public decisions related to specific operational activities.
In relation to State water resources policy, the models developed
by Kneese are constructs. In a more general analysis Ciriacy-Wantrup
has noted that the concept of maximizing the social satisfaction of
whole groups is really a scientific fiction - a conscious deviation from
reality to expedite understanding and explanation .3 The optimization
models are valuable in illustrating the nature and concept of external
costs. In forming public water resources policy flexibility and
security must be considered along with external costs.
1
Charles E. Lindblom, "Policy Analysis," The American Economic
Review (Vol. XLVIII No. 3), June 1958 (pp. 29932), p. 308.
Optimization of some specific function under each of a variety of
2
hypothetical institutional structures does not necessarily form a logical
basis for developing general policies. The role of institutional structures and general public policies is to guide the making of specific
decisions through time rather than to optimize some function at particular points in time. For additional discussion of the role of economic
optimizing in relation to water resources policy see: S. V. CiriacyWantrup, "Water Policy and Economic Optimizing: Some Conceptual Problems
in Water Research," The American Economic Review (Vol. LVII No. 2), May
1967, pp. 179-189.
Ciriacy-Wantrup, "Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System
of Water Rights," op. cit., pp. 309-310.
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3. Public policies and programs
External costs can be roughly controlled through public protection
of water quality and stream flow. However, individuals and organized
groups are more concerned with the protection of particular water uses
than with the setting of specific quality and flow objectives. General
policy issues relate to uses and to means of protecting those uses.
The public can usually express general values most clearly through a
reaction to specific proposals. Therefore, potential methods of State
control over the use of water resources will be summarized prior to a
discussion of quality and flow objectives.
Methods of public control:
State control over water use can be exercised through regulation,
cost-sharing, and charges. The first two approaches are presently being
utilized in Connecticut. Effluent and diversion charges would not
necessarily involve a radical change in policy.
State authority to regulate waste discharge is well established in
Connecticut. 1 Legislation regarding preservation of minimum natural
stream flow has been passed in several states. In Virginia and Arkansas
stream flow provisions relate only to impoundments, while in Florida,
Mississippi, and Iowa they also apply to direct withdrawals from
streams. 2 Regulatory protection of stream flow is basically very
similar to the regulation of waste discharges.
Cost-sharing includes grants, special tax considerations, and sales
of water from public projects at low prices. While special tax considerations for pollution control are often referred to as "economic incentives," the term "cost-sharing" is more accurate. Grants and tax
concessions reduce the cost of treatment, but they do not create an
actual incentive to treat wastes. The role of cost-sharing is to lower
resistance to the establishment and enforcement of more direct measures,
such as regulation. Providing water from public storage facilities at
low prices would reduce resistance to stream flow protection policies.
1
For a recent analysis of administrative procedures of the
Connecticut Department of Health and the Water Resources Commission
see: Theodore H. Focht, "Connecticut's Administrative Control of Water
Pollution--The Fluid Administrative Process," Report No. 8, Institute of
Water Resources, The University of Connecticut, April 1969.
Harold H. Ellis, "Relationships between Water and Other Property
2
Rights and Small Watershed Developments in the Eastern States," Economics
of Watershed Planning ed., by G. S. Tolley and F. E. Riggs (Iowa State
University Press, Ames, Iowa, 1961), (pp. 262-275), p. 270.
- 12 -

In theory, a system of charges could be rather simple where the
objective is to achieve and maintain specified flow and quality standards. Once target classifications had been set for each section of a
stream, the maximum acceptable rate of diversion and of discharge of
each type of waste could be established. Per-unit charges for flow
reduction and for each critical waste could then be set for each stream
section. Charges could be started at a relatively low level and
increased through time until diversions and waste discharges were
reduced to the rates consistent with target classifications. Charges
could also be used to supplement a program primarily dependent on
regulatory procedures.
Quality and flow objectives:
A definition of specific quality and flow objectives is needed to
link public desires for particular water uses to public policies. An
organized research and planning program is needed to provide this connecting link. Detailed study is essential in identifying the flow and
quality conditions required to assure the availability of desired water
uses. Policies and programs to protect water quality and stream flow
must be coordinated with policies pertaining to water supply, flood
control, power generation, recreational use of lakes and reservoirs,
and some aspects of land use planning. Public values expressed through
reactions to previous proposals can be projected into the planning
process. Meanwhile, research and planning programs should continually
provide the public with information about trends in water use and about
projections of future conditions likely to occur under alternative
policies.
In setting long range objectives, care must be taken to preserve
opportunities for future development. In the absence of effective planning an opportunity for future development can be lost with little
public attention or knowledge.
Ciriacy-Wantrup has suggested that the process of setting water
quality objectives can be greatly simplified through use of minimum
He suggests that the
standards stable over time for most streams.
basic minimum standard be one that maintains a healthy habitat for fish
life with allowance for uncertainty, particularly with regard to the
S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, "Water Quality, A Problem for the
Economists," Journal of Farm Economics (Vol. XLIII, No. 5), December 1961,
(pp. 1133-1146), p. 1142-4.
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cumulative effect of some pollutants. General recognition of a minimum
standard would not preclude setting a higher or lower standard for some
streams. The general minimum standard could be used as the base point
for evaluating alternatives.
The concept of a minimum standard can be applied to stream flow in
two ways: preservation of natural flow below a specified minimum for
non-depleting uses, and maintenance of a minimum flow through releases
from impoundments.

In the case of preserving natural flow a basic rule
for the entire state with criteria for deviations would seem feasible.
Detailed study involving numerous physical, economic, and social
considerations would, of course, be needed in setting the general standard and in defining criteria for deviations.
In establishing a flow
preservation program water users would have to be given sufficient
notice to allow time for construction of storage facilities or procurement of supplemental supplies.
Since maintenance of a particular flow would normally require
either publicly owned impoundments or public purchases from privately
owned storage, a general standard for the entire state would be useful
only in rather long range planning. Opportunities for low flow augmentation will probably have to be evaluated on an individual basis.
Two types of flow standards could be applied jointly. In formulating policy both standards could be jointly stated in terms of natural
flow patterns. For example, the instantaneous minimum flow could be
maintained at all times up to the lowest average monthly flow expected
to occur once in ten years while natural flows could be protected up to
the lowest average monthly flow expected to occur once in five years.
4.

Incentives for research

There is no direct incentive for a firm to develop new techniques
for reducing costs external to the decision unit. Where regulatory
standards are determined by available technology there is an incentive to
discourage research which might result in higher standards and increased
expenditures to reduce external costs. Research directed toward the
mitigation of external costs is dependent upon: (a) fortuitous correlations between external and internal costs; (b) third party expectations
of new markets; or (c) public support.
There seems to be at least some correlation between external and
internal costs for all water uses involving diversions and detentions of
stream flow.

Pumping, treatment, and distribution costs encourage some
- 14 -

economy in water use. Low operating cost for existing hydroelectric
stations has not discouraged research on alternative methods of supplying
capacity for peak loads. Expanding demands for electricity and lack of
sites for new on-stream peaking capacity have been effective in encouraging research on the use of pumped storage and gas turbines.
Much of the research directed toward improving techniques for treating sewage and industrial wastes has been sponsored by public agencies
and by firms expecting to increase sales of equipment and supplies.
Treatment problems of most municipalities are sufficiently similar to
utilize the results of a general research effort. However, the firms
discharging industrial wastes are often in the best position to develop
techniques for limiting waste creation and for specialized waste treatment. Thus, incentives for research by the discharger are essential
for long-run progress in industrial waste control.
B.

Security and Flexibility

Ciriacy-Wantrup has carefully developed the concepts of security
and flexibility as economic criteria for evaluating alternative systems
of water rights. 1 While his analysis was focused on withdrawal uses,
the basic concepts can also be applied to recreation, environmental
quality, and waste disposal. Since withdrawal uses in Connecticut are
often more competitive with in-stream uses than with other withdrawal
uses, the criteria must be stated in terms applicable to the entire
water law system.
For a water "right" to be secure there must be assurance that
sufficient water of acceptable quality will be available and the use
will not be prohibited either by a conflicting property claim or by a
change in public regulations. The possibility that use will be curtailed by a decrease in flow or quality will be referred to as "physical
uncertainty."2 The possibility that use will be restricted by a court

Ciriacy-Wantrup, "Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System
1
of Water Rights," op. cit.
2
In this study physical uncertainty includes the possibility that
use will be curtailed by either natural variations in flow or lawful
increases in use by others. Ciriacy-Wantrup used a more detailed classification. In his analysis physical uncertainty referred only to the
possibility of loss of use due to natural variations in flow. The
possibility that use would be curtailed by lawful increases in use by
others was referred to as "tenure uncertainty." Ibid., p. 297.
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injunction or an order from a public health officer or the Water
Resources Comnission will be referred to as "rule uncertainty." The two
types of uncertainty can be closely related. For example, for riparian
industries a strengthening of water pollution control regulations could
increase rule uncertainty regarding waste discharges and decrease physical uncertainty with regard to water supply.
Security against both types of uncertainty is a basic objective for
any water law system. There is no need to elaborate on the importance
of a dependable water supply for public distribution, irrigation, and
industrial use. Security with regard to future flow and quality is also
needed in planning conservation areas and developing facilities for
recreational uses. The need for security with regard to waste disposal
is not clearly recognized in existing water rights law. 1 Yet the privilege of discharging wastes is just as valuable as that of diverting a
water supply. 2 The possibility of a shift to extremely rigid pollution
control laws could discourage investment. On the other hand, the possibility of a substantial relaxing of pollution control standards could
also discourage investment by creating uncertainty about future water
supplies.
Security must be balanced with flexibility. A water law system
must provide flexibility to accomnodate shifts in water use in response
to changing technology, expanding urbanization, and growing public
interest in conservation and outdoor recreation. Shifts in use can be
provided for through changing public regulations, altering the definition
of reasonable use under the riparian rights doctrine, and transferring
property rights. Transfers of water rights include sales, condemnation
for public use, and loss of rights through prescription. 3
1
Reis, op.cit., pp. 49-51 and 70-74.
2
Consider, for example, a riparian industrial use involving no loss
of volume. An order prohibiting any future discharge of waste into the
stream would be equivalent to an order to cease diverting the supply if
no alternative place for disposal was available. A shift to complete
recirculation would be the only way to continue the operation. If other
streams could be used for water supply and waste disposal the costs of
shifting the waste discharge might be greater than developing a new
water supply.
Reis discussed additional ways in which rights may be lost and distinguishes between loss of the right to use water and loss of the right
itself. Of the methods of transfer listed above only a sale would involve a loss of the right itself according to Reis, op. cit., pp. 77.
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A joint use of security and flexibility as economic criteria
involves a major element of logical polarity; however, the objective is
not limited to a simple compromising of the two criteria. Institutional
changes can sometimes create new opportunities for development with
little or no threat to established uses.
For example, the Connecticut
statutes granting limited condemnation power to persons wishing to build
a mill pond and ditch system provide protection for owners of established mills and mill sites and protected other property owners by
requiring compensation of one and one-half times the assessed value of
damages.
A similar addition of flexibility might be achieved through
legislation permitting dischargers of heated water and some types of
industrial wastes to cooperatively supply low-flow augmentation in lieu
of cooling or treatment.
III.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Public Water Supplies

Connecticut courts have consistently held that a diversion of
stream flow for public water supply purposes is not a riparian use. 2
Public water supplies have been developed under statutes granting powers
of eminent domain. The purity of public water supplies is protected by
several specific statutes and the general powers of the State Department
of Health. Relationships between public water supply and other uses
have been determined by the interpretation and application of these
statutes in conjunction with common law principles.
1.

Condemnation powers

The Connecticut general statutes provide that municipalities or
corporations authorized to provide a public water supply may, with just
compensation, take and use lands, waters, and rights in land and water
within the authorized service area.
Exercise of eminent domain is
limited by a general requirement that the taking must be deemed necessary by the Superior Court. Prior to 1967 the general statutes gave
comdemnation power free of any requirement to maintain a minimum flow
downstream from water supply reservoirs.
Connecticut General Statutes (Rev.
2

1958),

Sec. 52-446 through 455.

Reis, op. cit., p. 54.
Connecticut General Statutes (Rev. 1958), Sec. 25-42.
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Many municipal water departments and privately owned water companies have been created through special acts of the General Assembly.
Some special acts provide explicit protection for existing water
companies. This protection is provided by a statement prohibiting the
purchase or condemnation of certain streams or lakes or by a general
statement that the sources of developed public water supplies shall not
be diminished.
Condemnation powers needed to develop a supply outside of the
authorized service area can be secured only through a special act. The
supplies of established water companies are usually protected either
explicitly or by limiting the area from which the newly-created water
company can develop a supply. 1 Among numerous special acts reviewed
only two provide protection for a water use other than another public
water supply.
Greenwich Water Company:
The special act authorizing the Greenwich Water Company to develop
public water supplies from the Mianus River provides specific protection
2
The authorfor the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company.
ity of the Water Company is subject to the right of the railroad company
to take water up to specified quantities for use at its power generating
plant at Cos Cob. The railroad was permitted to expand diversions
within the limits of a schedule of amounts which increased periodically
until January 1, 1942, when the maximum of five million gallons per day
was reached.
Use by the railroad never reached 5,000,000 gallons per day and has
3
The
declined to a current use of 300,000 to 400,000 gallons per day.

1
The term "water company" will be used to refer to either a privately
owned water company or a municipal water department except when modified
by the word "private."
2
Special Act No. 408, "An Act Establishing the Rights of the
Greenwich Water Company and the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad
Company in the Waters of the Mianus River," 1927 session of the General
Assembly of Connecticut, approved June 6, 1927.
3

Source: Telephone conversation with Mr. Carl H. Swanson, Chief
Engineer, Cos Cob Power Plant, New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad
Company, December 9, 1968.
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Water Company provides a minimum flow of approximately one million
gallons per day to the reservoir owned by the railroad. 1
From presently developed sources the Water Company could not supply
five million gallons per day to the railroad in addition to other commitments.

However, there are no plans for increasing the capacity of the

power plant at Cos Cob.

2

Thus, the rights of the railroad do not appear

to be a serious threat to the Water Company.
Metropolitan District Commission:
Plans by the Metropolitan District Commission (often referred to
as "MDC") to construct Hogback Reservoir on the West Branch of the
Farmington River aroused considerable concern over possible loss of
recreational uses and scenic values. A local interest group secured
protection for these uses through an agreement and through the special
act granting condemnation powers to "MDC".3
Allied Connecticut Towns, Inc., a non-profit Corporation, was
formed on December 10, 1948. Several of the persons forming the corporation owned land abutting the Farmington River downstream from the
proposed Hogback Reservoir. A nominal acreage of riparian land was
transferred to the corporation. Nevertheless, the objective was to
protect scenic and recreational uses throughout the watershed, and the
bargaining power of the corporation was based on political strength
rather than property rights.
Allied Connecticut Towns, Inc., agreed not to assert its common
law rights in exchange for rights defined in an agreement with "MDC".
Among other conditions "MDC" agreed to:
1
Source: Telephone conversation with Mr. James Cypher, Assistant
Manager, Greenwich Water Company, October 14, 1968.
2
A rebuilding and expansion of the plant might not result in additional water use from the reservoir. Brackish water is available for
cooling. The existing plant recovers only 5 to 10 percent of the water
in steam passing through the turbines. Ibid.
3
Several legal documents regarding riparian rights and the operation
of the Metropolitan District Commission are reprinted in Appendix C of
Water Resources Planning Study of the Farmington Valley, by Paul Bock,
Edwin E. Pyatt, and John A. DeFilippi (The Travelers Research Center,
Inc., Hartford, Connecticut), February 1965.
4
"Riparian Agreement Made April 18, 1949, Between the Allied
Connecticut Towns, Inc., and the Metropolitan District Commission,"
Water Resources Planning Study..., op. cit, Appendix C, pp. 345-350.
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1.

not build a dam in specified areas for a period of 75 years;

2.

permit boating and fishing on Hogback Reservoir and permit
hunting and fishing in all the watershed of the Hogback
Reservoir owned by the "MDC", subject to regulations promulgated by a commission provided for in the agreement; 1

3.

maintain through Hogback dam a minimum flow of 50 c.f.s. at

4.

all times;
allow free passage through Hogback of natural flows up to
150 c.f.s. exclusive of any water discharged from the Otis

5.

Reservoi r watershed;
have the contract ratified in the special act granting "MDC"
condemnation powers needed to build Hogback Reservoir.

The contract was subsequently ratified in a special act which also
restated most of the conditions to which "MDC" had agreed. 2
Having reviewed two exceptions in some detail, attention must be
returned to the usual pattern. Other public water supplies are the only
uses usually protected by restrictions on condemnation power. Thus,
riparian owners are informed that they can demand payment for property

rights lost but cannot prevent the development of public water supplies.
2.

Compensation requirements

Upstream uses threatening the purity of public water supplies can
be stopped without compensation under statutes protecting the purity
of public water supplies. 3 Reis cites several cases in which these
statutes have been enforced. 4
1
Water is diverted from Hogback to Barkhamstead Reservoir which is
not open to any recreational use.
2
Special Act No. 444--"An Act Increasing the Powers of the
Metropolitan District, Respecting Water," General Assembly, State of
Connecticut, 1949.
The requirement that natural flows up to 150 c.f.s. be passed
through the Reservoir was removed from Special Act No. 444 by Special
Act No. 141, "An Act Concerning the Powers of the Metropolitan District
Respecting Water," General Assembly, State of Connecticut, 1963.
However, the natural flow requirement is still in the agreement with
Allied Connecticut Towns, Inc.
3
Connecticut General Statutes (Rev.
Supplement 1965, Sec. 43.
4

Reis, op. cit., pp. 64-69.
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1958), Sec. 25-38 and 39, and

Condemnation of an upstream use to preserve flow for public water
supply would require compensation. However, water companies bear little
risk of incurring this type of expense in the foreseeable future. There
is very limited potential for expanded irrigation in the hills and
narrow valleys typical of public water supply watersheds in Connecticut.
Industries evaporating large quantities of water generally have sufficient waste discharge to proscribe their acceptability in a protected
watershed.
Compensation to downstream riparian owners generally has been
limited to those with an established commercial use of the stream.
Agreement to release specified flows in exchange for riparian claims to
natural flow have been used in coming to terms with riparians currently
using water for power or for industrial processing. Rights at established mill sites no longer in operation have been cleared through
purchasing riparian land and selling the land, less all claims to water
rights, back to the previous owner.
No case has been found of actual compensation to downstream
riparian owners for losses in recreational uses or scenic values
resulting from diminished flow. In the case of Adams vs. Greenwich
Water Company numerous riparian proprietors along the Mianus River
brought action to enjoin diversion from the river.
The court refused
to enjoin the diversion but "issued an injunction designed to force the
defendant into either: (1) ceasing to withdraw water from the Mianus
River; or (2) properly initiating an action to purchase the right to
continue the diversion of water from the river by eminent domain."2
The water company did initiate eminent domain proceedings, but there
was no actual compensation. 3 Some flow was maintained, and apparently
the riparian owners were not interested in collecting nominal damages
for losses in recreational and scenic values.

Source: Telephone conversation with Mr. James Cypher, Assistant
1
Manager, Greenwich Water Company, October 14, 1968.
2

Reis, op. cit., pp. 60-63.
Source:

Telephone conversation with Mr. Cypher, op. cit.
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3.

Public Act No. 792

New legislative restrictions on the development of public water
supplies were established in 1967.

Any person, corporation, or munic-

ipality receiving authority to divert water from a river for public use
by special act after January 1, 1967, must also obtain a permit from
the Water Resources Commission. Public interest in other water uses
must be considered in determining whether or not to issue a permit.
The Water Resources Commission is specifically instructed to consult
with other appropriate State agencies, including the State Department
of Health and State Board of Fisheries and Game, and to hold a public
hearing.

2

In its present form the Act is of limited significance to either
water companies or parties wishing to make other water uses. Most
municipalities and large privately owned water companies have extensive
authority to develop additional supplies under special acts passed
prior to January 1, 1967. Most of the recent special acts create water
companies to serve small suburban areas. These acts only authorize
the development of supplies from ground water, which is not covered by
Public Act 792. There had been no application for a permit as of
July 3, 1969.
4. Status of public water supplies
Lack of riparian status for public water supplies has not impaired
the development of supplies by municipalities and privately owned water
compani es.
A narrow view of the riparian doctrine would indicate that water
companies may be subject to many future civil suits for either flow
releases or compensation. However, most downstream riparian proprietors
probably have lost the power to exercise riparian rights through prescription. 3 The fact that a diversion for public water supply is never
a riparian use has probably been to the advantage of water companies in
securing prescriptive rights. In practice public water supplies are
well protected against both rule and fact uncertainties.

1
"An Act Concerning Use of Water from Rivers for Public Consumption"
(Connecticut Public Act No. 792, 1967, General Session).
2

Ibid., Sec. 2.

3

Reis, op. cit., pp. 82-87.
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B. Water Rights
An economic evaluation of existing water rights law must include
consideration of both current problems and characteristics of the
system which might result in future problems. While the immediate
objective is the identification of potential improvements in the definition of water rights, attention must also be given to the possibility
of solutions based on other approaches. Institutional modifications
outside the realm of water rights will be further developed in subsequent sections.
The first step in searching for an economically superior definition
of water rights is the identification of the dominant economic features
of the existing system. The riparian rights doctrine is primarily characterized by a preference for use on or associated with land contiguous
to the water course and by the coequal nature of the right. Riparian
owners are correlative cosharers in a right to make reasonable uses of
the water with no fixed quantity of water assured to any riparian owner.
In theory, new uses compete on an equal basis with established uses. In
practice, a determination of relative reasonableness usually involves
some preference for established uses in competition with a new use.
There has been no modern definition of ground water rights in
Connecticut. A decision in 1850 was based on an English concept of
absolute ownership of percolating ground water. 2 While it seems safe
to assume that the principle of absolute ownership would be abandoned
in a future case, there is little basis for presupposing the particular
concept most likely to be employed. Meanwhile, the absence of law is
effectively very similar to the principle of absolute ownership.
The appropriation doctrine, widely used in the western states, has
several features which contrast sharply with the basic principles of
the riparian doctrine. 3 Under the appropriation doctrine there is no

1

This tendency to protect the established user can be seen in several
of the cases cited by Reis, op. cit., pp. 24-44. For additional information see: J. H. Beuscher, "Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian
Doctrine States," Buffalo Law Review (Vol. 10, No. 3), Summer 1961, pp.
448-455.
2

Reis, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

3

Wells A. Hutchins and Harry A. Steele, "Basic Water Rights Doctrines
and Their Implications for River Basin Development," Law and Contemporary

Problems (Vol.

XXII, No. 2), Spring 1957, pp. 276-300.
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preference for use on larnd adjoinin S ti-ewater course. A water right
is acquired through use. An appropriative rhib,is for a particular
quantity of water per unit of tio)e and often relates to a snecific tile,
rate, place, and method of diversion. In times of shortage senior
rights have priority over junior rights.
Originally, appropriative rights were acquired simply through
diversion and beneficial use. Each of the states recognizing the appropriation doctrone now has a statutory procedure for acquiring rights.
The procedures usually involve an anplication to a state agency, a
permit to initiate a new diversion, and a license or certificate after
a beneficial use has been established.

In soTme states the statutes

specify an order of preferences based on the proposed use. These preferences usually relate only tc conflicting applications pending before
the state administrator at the same time. In some states municipalities
can file claims fcr future use which can be reserved without current use.
The contrast between the riparian doctrine and the appropriative
doctrine provides a convenient and challenging basis for comparative
analysis. The relative merits of the two systems have been evaluated in
several studies. 1 This analysis iwill be focused on features particularly
relevant in Connecticut. On the other hand, consideration will be given
to concepts not closely associated with either of these established
doctrines.
1. Locational preferences
The strong preference for riparian uses is the most obvious inflexibility of the riparian doctrine. Hcwever, both legal interpretations and
geographical factors must be considered in assessing the practical importance of limitations resulting from the preference for riparian uses.
1
For a collection of papers see: The Law of Water Allocation in the
Eastern States, Papers and Proceedings of a Symposium held in Washington,
D.C., October 1956, sponsored by the Conservation Foundation, edited by
David Haber and Stenhen W. Bergen (The Ronald Press Company. New Yorl,),
1958.
Papers focused on a comparative analysis include: Charles N. Haar
and Barbara Gordon, "Legislative Change of Water Law in Massach'usetts -A Case Study of the Consequences of Introducing a Prior hnpropriation
System," pp. 1-48.
Clyde 0. Fisher, Jr., "Western Experientce and Eastern Appro['riation
Proposals," pp.

75-154.

S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, "Concepts Used as Lconomic Criteria for a
System of Water Rights," pp. 531-564 (also in Land Economics, op. cit.).
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Non-riparian uses have been allowed subject to the actual needs of
riparians.
Despite statements which may be found in the cases to
the effect that any diversions by a non-riparian is
unlawful, as a matter of practical construction the
Connecticut courts have generally required a showing
of injury by the complaining riparian proprietor before
awarding either compensatory damages or an injunction
to prevent future withdrawals. Therefore, rather than
being "unlawful" and prohibited under any circumstances,
the withdrawal of water by a non-riparian, or by a
riparian for use on non-riparian lands, is under the
practical construction of the courts a temporarily
1
permissive withdrawal until a riparian can show damages.
Some additional flexibility can be achieved through conveyance. "A
.2
riparian may convey his 'right' to the use of water to a non-riparian."
However, a conveyance is only a grant of permission. The grantee does
not gain riparian status.

A new use by an uncommitted riparian would

have priority over an established non-riparian use. Physical uncertainty
for the non-riparian can be eliminated only through procuring a release
from all upstream riparians. A release from all downstream riparians
would be necessary to avoid rule uncertainty. In most situations a nonriparian without condemnation power has little opportunity to obtain
completely secure rights to the use of water through purchasing releases.
A non-riparian can gain rights to the use of water through prescription against downstream riparians. In Connecticut fifteen years of
continuous use adverse to a riparian's right with no legal action by the
riparian can result in a prescriptive right even if the riparian was not
physically short of water for uses made during the period.
However, the
possibility of gaining a prescriptive right after fifteen years is a weak
basis for investment unless an alternative water supply is available.
Several geographical factors indicate that the uncertain status of
non-riparian uses has not been a major obstruction to economic development in Connecticut. Most of the better agricultural land is in the
river valleys where much of the land is riparian and where ground water
resources are generally sufficient for supplemental irrigation. Moreover, much of the riparian land is not irrigated. There is no shortage
1
2

Reis, op. cit., p. 44.
Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid.,

pp. 82-87.
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of riparian sites for industry.

Establishment of a large water-using

industry away from the water course would require expenditure for
rights-of-way and construction of conveyance facilities. Industries
using small or moderate amounts of water can select a location either
with a public water supply or with adequate ground water resources.
The locational inflexibility of the riparian doctrine probably
creates some inconvenience and should be removed in the course of a
major revision of water rights law. Of its own accord the economic
consequences of the existing preference for riparian uses do not merit
the effort of a basic redefinition of water rights in Connecticut.
2.

Common law protection against pollution

Private property rights can be effective in providing protection
against pollution only to the extent that the loss resulting from a
particular source of waste can be clearly identified. Unfortunately,
the identification of loss from individual sources is almost impossible
where waters receive wastes from numerous outfalls. The potential role
of civil suits in pollution control is further limited by the dispersion
of damages among many existing and prospective water users. General
progress in pollution control is dependent upon financial assistance
to municipalities and regulatory action. However, these more direct
public activities can be supplemented through private suits provided
rights are sufficiently well defined.
In 1858 a Connecticut court ruled that a landowner depositing waste
on his land was not liable for pollution of a neighbor's well if the
wastes were washed into the ground and commingled with subterraneous
streams or currents before entering the well. 1 The court went on to
note that the liability would be created if the wastes were washed along
the surface and into the well or if they soaked into the ground and
entered the well without mingling with the underground streams or
currents supplying the well.
A more recent case involved the pollution of a well by gasoline of
a type stored in an underground tank across the street from the plaintiff's well. 2 The plaintiff was awarded the full cost of drilling and
1

Reis, op.

cit., pp. 159-163.

Arthur J. Blais, et al., The Callahan Oil Company, Court of Common
2
Pleas, Windham County, File No. 922 (18 Conn. Suppl.), case completed
and filed October 21, 1952.
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equipping a new well on another part of his property. The court noted
that the liability of the defendant did not depend in any way on proven
negligence. In this case the court did not attempt to distinguish
between pollution of percolating water and pollution of water in underground streams.
The right of a riparian proprietor to compensation for damages
resulting from waste discharges by a municipality was clearly established in four decisions between 1892 and 1904.1 Claimed riparian and
prescriptive rights to pollute were both denied. Similar claims of
pollution rights by a private riparian were denied in 1910.2
One Connecticut decision could be interpreted as upholding the right
of a riparian to cause injurious pollution at least within a particular
situation.3 The plaintiff, a dye producer, brought suit to enjoin the
defendant from continuing to discharge metallic wastes into a stream
formerly used as a water supply by the plaintiff. The dye producer
claimed that declining water quality had forced the company to purchase
water from other sources. As summarized by Reis "The court held that
since the defendant had done everything within its power to treat the
water before it was returned to the stream its discharge was a reasonable use under the circumstances. "4 In analyzing the case Reis notes
that several factors bearing in the decision should be considered:
First, the defendant was engaged in war production
during a period of emergency. Second, there had
been an increase in both manufacturing and urban
population density along the stream--both invariably
contributing to the overall quality of the water.
Finally, the plaintiff had not been totally deprived
of water for the production and manufacture of
supplies, but was able to secure water from the
Stamford Water Company;...

One exception during this period allowed a city in a particular
situation to acquire a right to pollute based upon the silence of a
riparian proprietor. Reis, op. cit., pp. 70-74.
2

Ibid., p. 50.

3

Stamford Extract Manufacturing Company v. Stamford Rolling Mills
Co., 101 Connecticut 310; 125 At 1.623 (1924) as cited by Reis, op. cit.,
pp. 50-51.
Reis, op. cit., p. 51.
5

Ibid.
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An injunction against the defendant would have created an unnecessary hardship and would have resulted in an inefficient allocation of
resources. However, an award of damages equal to the additional cost of
purchasing water would have been consistent with established principles
of equity and would have encouraged the defendant to continually seek
more effective methods of reducing the amount of waste discharged.
The extent to which initiation of private suits against waste
dischargers has been discouraged by the decision in "Stamford Extract
Manufacturing Company v. Stamford Rolling Mills Company" is open to
speculation. The special circumstances of the case, the later ruling on
damages from ground water pollution, and increased public concern over
pollution, limit the probable influence of the decision on the results
of a future case. Legal research is needed to determine the extent to
which riparians have been influenced by the decision. Either substantial evidence that the decision is discouraging action by riparians, or
a future decision excusing injurious pollution on the grounds of treatment by known techniques would create a clear need for legislation
defining the rights of riparians to protection against damages from
waste discharges.
3.

Consumptive use

Limitations of the riparian doctrine in efficiently allocating and
reallocating water among consumptive uses have been well established.
With competing consumptive uses there would be little security in a
coequal right unless established uses were protected to the point of
little flexibility. Allocation would depend on a judicial determination
of the reasonable use of each riparian in relation to the total supply.
With competition among consumptive users there would be little opportunity for achieving a reallocation through market transfers. Purchase of
a release from one riparian would not protect the grantee from increased

1
Ciriacy-Wantrup, "Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System
of Water Rights," op. cit.
Jack Hirshleifer, James C. DeHaven, and Jerome W. Milliman, Water
Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy (The University of Chicago
Press, 1963), pp 231-245.
Frank J. Trelease, "A Model State Water Code for River Basin
Development," Law and Contemporary Problems (Vol. XXII, No. 2), Spring
1957, pp. 301-3--- 28 -

use by other riparians. With keen competition for the available supply
the court would have to periodically reevaluate established uses in
relation to each other and to proposed new uses.
Flexibility would be
achieved only through uncertainty.
In establishing a perspective on the likelihood of serious water
rights problems associated with consumptive use in Connecticut a distinction must be made between water purchased from public purveyors and
water withdrawn on the basis of riparian rights. A diversion for public
water supply is not a riparian use, and the entire amount diverted is
lost for at least a substantial length of the stream regardless of the
eventual use. A distinction between the two sources does not mean that
attention can be limited to consumptive loss from water diverted by
riparian users. Many industrial firms use water from both company owned
systems and public water supplies. Some firms discharge waste water
both to sewers and directly to natural waters.
A complete survey of industrial water use is made by the United
States Bureau of the Census at five-year intervals. Data in Table 1 is
the most recent available. Net loss plus discharge to public sewers
amounted to 22 billion gallons in 1964. Purchases of 28 billion gallons
from public water purveyors do not indicate an augmentation of natural
fresh waters since an unknown amount of originally fresh water was
discharged into brackish waters.
Data on sources of water for agricultural irrigation in 1960 are
the most recent available. The United States Bureau of the Census survey
of 1960 irrigation practices included only farms reporting irrigation in
the 1959 Census of Agriculture.
Of the 173 farms reporting irrigation,
117 farms reported ownership of a total of 241 constructed reservoirs.
Unfortunately, there is no data on the size of reservoirs or on the
acreage irrigated from stored water. Data on the source of water,
summarized in Table 2, cannot be related to the use of reservoirs.
The acreage of farmland irrigated in Connecticut varies widely from
year to year in response to weather conditions. Acreage irrigated in
agricultural census years is reported in Table 3. Under Connecticut

1
U. S. Bureau of the Census, "U. S. Census of Agriculture: 1959,
Volume V, Part 2, Irrigation in Humid Areas" (U. S. Printing Office,
Washington, D. C., 1960), p. X.
2

Ibid., p. 13.
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TABLE

1

Fresh Water Intake and Discharge
by Industry in Connecticut -- 1964 a
(billion gallons per year)
Water Intake
From company water systems
surface 42
ground
7
From public water systems

49

28
Total intake

77

Water Discharge
Public sewer
Surface water

15
54

Subsurface systems

1
Total discharge
Water loss

70
7

a U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Census of Manufacturers, 1963,
Volume 1, Summary and Subject Statistics," (U. S. Printing
Office, Washington, D. C., 1966), pp. 10-96 and 10-97, except
for corrections based on information from William R. Gray,
Industry Division, U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department
of Commerce. The large consumptive use indicated by the
published data result from an error in compiling data
on water discharged by industries in the chemicals and allied
products group. Industries in this group discharged 28 billion
gallons to surface water rather than nine billion as reported.
The data in Table 1 are adjusted to correct this error. The
data were also adjusted to exclude brackish water from discharges.
It was assumed that all of the 68 billion gallons of brackish
water, reported on page 10-96, was discharged to surface water.

__

__
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TABLE

2

Acreage of Connecticut Farmland Irrigated
by Source of Water -- 1960a
Source

Acres
218

Wells
Natural streams and rivers
Springs and seepage
Farm runoff
Natural lakes and ponds
Drainage ditches
Municipal water systems

2,516
979
124
325
7
224
4,393

Total

a "U. S. Census of Agriculture: 1959, Volume V, Part 2,
Irrigation in Humid Areas," op. cit., p. 12. Note: The
survey of 1960 irrigation practices included only farms
reporting irrigation in the 1959 Census of Agriculture.

TABLE 3
Acreage of Farmland Irrigated in Connecticuta
Year
1939
1944
1949
1954
1959
1964
* less than 500 acres

1,000 Acres
1
*
8
12
5
14

a U. S. Department of Agriculture, "Agricultural Statistics, 1969"
(U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1969), p. 431.
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climatic conditions most farmers have chosen to invest in irrigation
equipment only for use on crops of relatively high economic value.
The small amount of consumptive use in Connecticut is not a completely sufficient basis for concluding that there would be no advantage
in shifting toward a system more adapted to allocating water among
competing consumptive uses. At least to some extent, the small amount
of consumptive use could be the result of uncertainty about water
rights. Absence of frequent litigation does not prove that use is not
restricted by fear of litigation. Fortunately, a hypothesis that use
is restricted substantially by uncertainty can be tested against observations on the pattern of water use. If there were substantial fear of
litigation, industries with relatively high percentages of consumptive
loss could be expected to use public water supplies to a greater extent
than industries with little consumptive use. This pattern is not
Available
reflected in data on industrial water use in Connecticut.
data indicate that acreage of farmland irrigated has varied with the
need for supplemental irrigation rather than with the supply of water.
Of the years for which data are available the most extensive irrigation
2
occurred in 1964, a year of severe drought by Connecticut standards.
These water use patterns are not consistent with the hypothesis that
consumptive uses are restricted by fear of litigation.
Questions pertaining to the adequacy of water supplies and uncertainty about water rights were included in a 1957 survey of irrigation
practices in Connecticut. 3 The survey included 167 farmers practicing
irrigation in 1957, which had an extremely dry growing season. Thirteen
farmers considered that their water use had been restricted by competing
uses. 4 Of the 167 farmers 22 had investigated legal rights to water;
five reported past, current, or expected challenge of water rights;
U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Census of Manufacturers, 1963, Volume
1
1, Summary and Subject Statistics," op. cit., pp. 10-96 and 10-97.
Byron E. Janes and Joseph J. Brumbach, "The 1964 Agricultural
2
Drought in Connecticut" (Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 390,
June 1965, University of Connecticut), 22 pp.
3

Horace L. Puterbaugh and Marvin W. Kottke, "Technical and Economic
Characteristics of Irrigation on Connecticut Farms" (Agricultural
Experiment Station Bulletin 340, March 1959, University of Connecticut),
42 pp.
4

Ibid., p. 15.
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sixteen had a verbal agreement with others using water from the same
source; and two had a written agreement.
The results of the survey
do not indicate a major concern about uncertainty of water rights.
Foreseeable consumptive use in Connecticut is not sufficient to
merit adoption of a water rights system focused primarily on water
allocation. Common-law water rights can be supplemented with stream
flow protection and ground water management policies without a complete
redefinition of water rights. Moreover, such policies can include
diversions and extractions for public water supply as well as withdrawals
based on private property rights.
A substantial increase in demand for consumptive use would increase
the need for more effective <use of market processes in water allocation.
More direct use of a pricing system would not necessarily involve a
shift toward appropriative rights. An efficient allocation could be
encouraged through fees on withdrawals from natural sources with the
funds used to augment available supplies through storage and ground
water recharge. Such activities could be administered through regional
authorities or districts.
4.

Recreational and environmental uses

)

Uncertainty about property rights and dispersion of losses among
numerous property owners have limited the ability of riparians to
protect recreational uses and environmental values. The limitations of
civil suits in providing protection against pollution from multiple
sources are compounded when damage is dispersed among many noncommercial
users. Even in the rather simple situation of a substantial reduction
in flow by a single party the downstream losses in recreational and
scenic values have taken the form of external costs.
The generally unrestricted powers of municipalities and privately
owned water companies to develop supplies leave riparians little opportunity to protect in-stream uses. Since riparian owners can ccllect only
nominal damages for recreational and scenic losses resulting from diversions for public water supply, there is no way for riparian owners to
create an economic incentive for water companies to provide flow releases
Moreover, rights to even nominal damages from
for these purposes.
established diversions probably have been lost through prescription in
most cases.
1

Ibid.
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Wide fluctuations in flow and extremely low flows result from peak
load generation at hydroelectric stations.

Data in Tables 4 and 5 are

from a gaging station 0.4 miles downstream from the Farmington River
Power Company dam.

Both days of extremely low flow (Table 4) were

Sundays when power demands are relatively small.
Under Connecticut law, detentions for power production are clearly
dominant over recreational and scenic uses. When water power even on
small streams was vital to the economy, maximum power during normal
working hours was the primary objective. In an exhaustive review of
case law in Connecticut, Reis found no case where riparians even
Considering
attempted to protect recreational uses against detentions.
the usual definition of prescriptive rights there seems to be little
chance for increasing demands for recreational uses to be reflected
through claims based on riparian rights.
Interesting methods of protecting environmental uses have been
developed in some western states. While an appropriative right is based
on diversion and use, most states recognizing appropriative rights
authorize the responsible administrative agency to deny applications
contrary to the public interest. By statute Oregon has excluded from
appropriation the water of some streams to preserve fish life and scenic
attractions. Some states allow administrative agencies to withdraw
water from availability for appropriation for a variety of purposes,
2
These
including preservation of scenic values and in-stream uses.
approaches operate through control over the initiation of new uses.
Water use in Connecticut has already developed to the point where public
controls exempting established uses would be of limited significance.
5.

Status of water rights

This analysis has produced no economic basis for recommending the
adoption of a system of quantitatively defined water rights in
Connecticut. Major opportunities for controlling external costs and
1
In one case a riparian owner was able to limit diversions from a
pond for power to the extent that the bottom not be exposed in such a
manner as to create offensive sights and odors, Reis, pp. cit., p. 43.
For two somewhat contrasting perspectives on the effectiveness of
2
these methods of protecting environmental uses see: Fisher, "Western
Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals," op. cit., pp. 129-132;
and Trelease, "A Model State Water Code for River Basin Development,"
op. cit., pp. 317-318.
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TABLE 4
Flow in the Farmington River at
Rainbow, Connecticut -- September 1967a
Date
1

2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
a

Ave. Discharge c.f.s.
395
262
127
145
252
269
445
242
203
24 (Sunday)
267
186
131
142
147

Date
16
17
18

Ave. Discharge c.f.s
110

189
253
323

19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

199

256
158
166
22 (Sunday)
204
66
295
281
493
436

U. S. Geological Survey, Water Resources Division, U. S.
Department of the Interior, "Water Resources Data for
Connecticut--1967" (Hartford, Connecticut, 1968), p. 53.

__

TABLE 5
Flow Pattern of the Farmington River at
Rainbow, Connecticut -- September 30, 1967a
Time
2
4
6
8
10
12

a.m.
a.m.
a.m.
a.m.
a.m.
m.

Discharge c.f.s.

Time

24
23
23
23
1,990
1,960

2
4
6
8
10
12

p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.
p.m.

Discharge c.f.s.
180
24
21
21
20
20

a Unpublished records of the U. S. Department of the Interior,
Geological Survey, Water Resources Division, Hartford,
Connecti cut.
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physical uncertainties from waste discharges and diminutions of flow are
in the area of public regulation rather than property rights. There is
no indication that expanded regulation would create rule uncertainty
in excess of that which would be created by a redefinition of property
rights. With regulatory protection of flow and quality, an evolving
concept of reasonable use (expanded to include ground water extractions)
should be a sufficient basis for settling specific conflicts over private
water rights.
C.

Stream Flow and Ground Water Management

Several elements of public interest in stream flow protection and
management have been established. Riparian owners have little practical
opportunity to protect in-stream uses from detentions and depleting
diversions. Many environmental uses are related to public recreation
areas including numerous streams on which the State has procured public
access rights for recreational fishing. Effective water quality management requires coordinated control over stream flow and waste discharges.
To date there has been little need for public management of ground
water withdrawals in Connecticut. There has been no long-run decline in
ground water levels. There are opportunities for expanded use of ground
water resources in many parts of the state; however, the current trend
toward relatively greater use of ground water could be accelerated by
stream flow protection policies. With increasing use of ground water new
forms of public policy will be needed for effective use of underground
storage without excessive impact on low stream flow conditions.
Public policies in water resources management involve a complex
interweaving of regulation and direct public activities. In developing
general economic criteria for evaluating water law there was a clear
distinction between protection of natural flows below a specified level
through regulation, and low-flow augmentation at public expense. There
are exceptions to this pairing of function and method. Prior to 1963 the
Metropolitan District Commission was required to both release a minimum
flow of 50 c.f.s. at all times and pass natural flows up to 150 c.f.s .
Looking to the future, the political feasibility of regulatory protection
of low natural flows may be enhanced by the construction of multiple
purpose reservoirs with capacity for storage from high flows for both
low-flow augmentation and sales to downstream users. Thus, the relationship of riparian rights to the operation of State- and federally-owned
-
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reservoirs will be considered prior to the development of recommendations
pertaining to regulatory protection of low natural flows.
1. Public storage for flow management
State authority needed to facilitate state and federal low-flow
augmentation activities has been identified by Kendall in a study sponsored by the New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission.
Based on an extensive analysis Kendall made the following recommendations:
For purposes of stream flow regulation and augmentation, as
contemplated in this study, no great modification of the
riparian doctrine is needed. It is submitted that statutes
enacted to effect the following principles would provide
sufficient basis for stream flow regulation and augmentation:
1.

No action shall be brought to recover damages or to
enjoin an upstream storage or diversion of stream
flow, unless actual harm is done to the plaintiff's
riparian estate.

2.

The Water Resources Commission, or similar state
agency, shall be empowered to order releases of
water in reasonable quantities from storage
facilities for stream flow augmentation. Reasonable
compensation for the value of the released waters
shall be paid to the proprietor of the facility.

3.

The Water Resources Commission, or similar state
agency, shall be empowered to participate in regional
planning and the operation of multiple-purpose water
storage facilities, and to order the transfer of water
between watersheds and river basins in the public
interest, and to engage in interstate transfers.

4.

The Water Resources Commission, or similar state
agency, shall be empowered to detain, divert and store
for public purposes, water flowing in watercourses
within the state, upon payment of reasonable compensation for property or interests actually harmed
thereby. Thereafter, title to waters so stored shall
be in the public and such title shall be retained when
the waters are released for stream flow augmentation,
for transfer to another storage facility, or for other
public purposes. No proprietor of a flow regulation
structure shall detain public waters being transferred
by order of the Water Resources Commission.

1
Kendall, James H., "Water Law: Streamflow Rights in New England and
New York State" (published by New England Interstate Water Pollution
Control Commission, Boston, Massachusetts), November 1967 (47 pp.)
2Ibid., p. 31.
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These recommendations are consistent with the previously discussed
economic criteria.

However, a broader range of flexibility in water

management could be assured by expanding these recommendations to
specifically authorize the sale of publicly stored water for private
use.

This authorization would permit greater flexibility in water use
and would facilitate regulatory protection of low natural flows.
Many of the economic decisions pertaining to low-flow augmentation
are in the area of benefit-cost analysis.
The benefits and costs of
providing storage capacity for low-flow augmentation and for other uses
such as flood control, water supply and recreation must be evaluated in
relation to available reservoir sites. However, many of the benefits
associated with recreational uses and environmental protection cannot
be readily measured through market values. In some situations monetary
values of non-market uses can be estimated indirectly on the basis of
the lowest cost of achieving the same objective by other projects or
procedures. Assuming that the lowest cost alternative is considered,
the validity of the process depends on the acceptability of the original
objective. The key decisions in estimating benefits through the alternative cost method are very similar to those in setting objectives for
regulatory protection of flow and quality.
2.

Stream flow objectives

The process of setting objectives for a stream flow protection
policy should include: a determination of the cost of protecting various
flow levels, an identification of the flows needed for particular uses,
and a determination of the economic and social evaluation of the potential uses. Public reaction to specific proposals can provide a rough

Some new approaches in benefit-cost analysis have been recently
1
suggested. The central recommendation is to begin an analysis with
explicit recognition of multiple social objectives such as economic
efficiency, regional economic stimulation, and income redistribution.
Particular project alternatives can then be evaluated in relation to
each objective. The final decision would involve a weighting of the
For information on this
objectives through the political process.
approach see: Robert J. Kalter, et al., "Criteria for Federal Evaluation
of Resource Investments" (Water Resources and Marine Sciences Center,
Cornell University), August 1969, 11 pp.
For an extensive bibliography on earlier studies see: Hinote,
Herbert, "Benefit-Cost Analysis for Water Resource Projects: A Selected
Annotated Bibliography (revised edition)" (Center for Business and
Economic Research, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee),
June 1969.
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index of social values. Some perspective on the process of objective
formulation and on the range of possible objectives can be gained from
a brief review of some existing flow objectives and current planning
activities.
In setting water quality standards for Connecticut the Water
Resources Commission gave specific recognition to the impact of low flow
conditions on stream quality. "The minimum average daily flow for seven
consecutive days that can be expected to occur once in ten years shall
be the minimum flow to which the standards apply."1 This limit is based
on actual flow. Thus, an increase in depleting diversions from a stream
would require either a reduction in the maximum permissible discharge of
waste or a lowering of the stream classification.
Minimum flow objectives for the main stem of the Connecticut
River have been proposed by the Connecticut River Basin Coordinating
Committee:2

Adequate minimum flows are essential to the ultimate
achievement of the goals of the anadromous fishery program.
Preliminary analysis of natural flows in the Connecticut
Basin streams indicates that, from a fishery viewpoint, the
instantaneous minimum flow release at main stem dams along
the Connecticut River should be 0.25 cubic feet per second
for each square mile of drainage area upstream from the dam
in question.
The coordinating Committee for the Comprehensive Study
recognizes this need for adequate minimum flows and has
recommended that a minimum instantaneous release of 0.20
csm (cubic feet per second per square mile) be maintained
at five existing main stem power dams with the remaining
flows to be provided by releases from new and existing
tributary reservoirs.
The reservation of minimum flows is a major element of state water
policy in Iowa. Under legislation passed in 1957 the Iowa Natural
Resources Council has the power and duty to plan and regulate (within

1
"Water Quality Standards," State of Connecticut, Water Resources
Commission, Hartford, Connecticut, 1968 (30 pp. + maps), p. 5.
2
This committee is composed of representatives from six Federal
agencies, the four basin states, and the New England River Basins
Commission.
"Comprehensive Water and Related Land Resources Investigation -Connecticut River Basin -- Information for Public Hearings,"
Connecticut River Basin Coordinating Committee, Waltham, Massachusetts,
January 1970 (81 pp.), p. 42.
- 39 -

limits) the use of water. 1 Except for specified unregulated uses, a
permit must be obtained for withdrawing water from any natural source.
The Council is required to limit permits to protect the "established
The statute also instructs
average minimum flow" for each water course.
the Council to establish the average minimum flow (protected flow) on the
basis of average minimum daily flows in preceding years and the minimum
flow needed to protect the public interest. After extensive study and
consultations the Council adopted a general policy of setting the
protected flow for each stream at the level equaled or exceeded 84 per
cent of the time between April and September in past years determined to
be most representative of normal conditions. In applying the 84 per cent
standard, adjustments were made to account for particular characteristics
and uses of each stream.3
Much of the information needed for setting flow objectives in
Connecticut should become available through a current planning project.
In 1967 the General Assembly instructed the Water Resources Commission,
the State Department of Health, the State Board of Fisheries and Game,
and the Connecticut Development Cornrission to jointly prepare a statewide, long range plan for the management of the water resources. 4 The
Act authorized bond sales of $1,500,000 to finance the planning project.
While the Act does not refer directly to stream flow objectives, there
is clear instruction to consider all water uses, including recreation.
Thus, some form of recommendations pertaining to flow preservation and
maintenance can be expected. These recommendations could serve as the
basis for legislative policy. More specific operating objectives could
be set by the agency made responsible for administration.
3. Implementation and administration
The Water Resources Commission appears to be the appropriate agency
to implement and administer a stream flow and ground water protection
1

Hines, N. William, "A Decade of Experience under the Iowa Water
Permit System -- Part One," Natural Resources Journal (Vol. 7, No. 4),
October 1967, pp. 499-554.
2

Ibid., p. 538.

3

Ibid., p. 541.

4

"An Act Concerning Long Range Water Resources Planning"
(Connecticut Public Act No. 477, 1967, General Session).
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policy. Specific flow objectives should be closely related to water
quality objectives and to potential public and private uses. Moreover,
the Connission has extensive data on industrial water use and sources
of supply as well as waste discharges.
Implementation of a comprehensive water management program would
require authority to regulate both new and existing detentions and
diversiors of stream flow and ground water extractions. Regulatory
authority could be created through a statutory definition of public
intcrest analogous to that in the statutes which authorize the Water
Resources Commission to regulate the discharge of wastes to natural
waters.
Regulatory authority should cover both public water purveyors
and parties developing supplies on the basis of private rights.
Regulation to protect a defined public interest would not involve a
redefinition of water rights. Regulations would take effect through
limiting the exercise of both property rights and condemnation powers.
Adninistration of a regulatory program would involve some form
of permit system. Detentions, diversions, and extractions below some
established minimum could be exempted from regulation for administrative
convenience and economy.2 Water use intensity varies regionally and
through time; thus, there would be practical advantage in allowing the
responsible administrative agency some discretion in specifying the
maximum use to be exempt from regulation. Since the program would be
new and there would be an immediate need to consider all major uses,
permits should be required for established as well as new uses. Permits
to established users should include a schedule for accomplishing steps
necessary in adjusting operations to allow free passage of the protected
flow or to reduce ground water extractions from an overdrawn area. In
establishing schedules, time should be allowed for constructing storage
facilities, developing alternative sources of power, or developing
alternative sources of water as the case may be. This scheduling could
be similar to that currently in use for orders to abate existing sources
of water pollution. Administrative procedures regarding the term of

(Connecticut Public Act No. 57) op. cit., Section 1.
The pern.it system implementing the Iowa stream flow protection
policy exempts from regulation uses of less than 5,000 gallons per day.
Hines, op. cit., p. 508.
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permits and provisions for hearings and appeals could also be similar
to those for discharge permits and pollution abatement orders. 1
As envisioned in this report the objective of the permit system
would be to protect specified stream flows. This protection should be
provided with a minimum of involvement in the process of allocation
among depleting users. The Iowa permit system has been carefully
designed to avoid involvement in this allocative process. However,
success in avoiding the allocation issue stems, at least in part, from
the fact that uses within municipal corporations at the time of the
legislation are exempt from regulation. With this exemption, irrigation
was the only major depleting use immediately subject to regulation.
Among the regulated uses there are no priorities based on the date of
initial use, the date of the permit, or the type of use.
Administration of the Iowa system involves the definition of an
equivalent protected flow at each point of withdrawal in relation to the
protected flow at a downstream gaging station. A summation flow rule
has been developed for protecting stream sections with more than one
consumptive user. Under the summation flow rule the cutoff point for
each consumptive user is the equivalent protected flow plus the sum of
all other permitted consumptive uses from a particular stream section.
The Commissioner allows use below the summation flow level only if all
users along a stream section enter into a sharing agreement which assures
2
preservation of the protected flow.
The formation of sharing agreements
is left entirely to the permit holders. If one user should attempt to
hold out for a particularly large share of the difference between the
summation flow level and the protected level the other users could
presumably force a settlement on the basis of riparian rights. Since
the permit system relates to both detentions and direct withdrawals for
immediate use, the sharing agreement could include the timing of detentions and of withdrawals for off-stream storage.
The use of cutoff points does not imply an actual rationing of
water.

Sufficient notice to allow time for construction of storage

facilities or development of alternative supplies is a basic element of
the proposal for Connecticut. Protected flows, summation flow levels,
1

(Connecticut Public Act No. 57) op. cit., Sections 7-17.

2

Hines, op. cit., pp. 542-544.
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sharing agreements, and cutoff points would become fundamental considerations in planning storage requirements. Expanded opportunities to
purchase stored water from state or federally owned reservoirs could
facilitate implementation of a stream flow protection policy.
A permit from the Water Resources Commission should be required
prior to drilling of a well with anticipated capacity as great as the
rate of extraction covered by use permits.
While there are opportunities for increased ground water withdrawals in many parts of the State,
the location of high-capacity wells should be carefully selected in
order to utilize underground storage without excessive impact on low
stream flow conditions. Increasing demands for water and declining
availability of sites for surface storage can be expected to generate
a growing need for more effective management of natural underground
storage capacity. Beyond planned well location, management could be
intensified through coordinated timing of withdrawals from different
parts of a basin and from the streams associated with the basin.
Other potential ground water management practices include artificial recharge with cooling water or with local or imported surface
supplies when available in quantities beyond immediate needs. Ground
water replenishment districts with authority to assess ground water
extractions to finance replenishment activities are making substantial
contributions toward effective water resources management in California.
If the need arises similar districts could be formed in Connecticut. 2 A
combination of ground water replenishment and assessments on extractions
would both augment natural supplies and encourage users to seek alternative sources. Thus, actual rationing could be on an economic basis with
permits providing an element of coordination.
1
This permit could be either in addition to or in place of permits
currently required to collect geological information and regulate the
well drilling industry. "An Act Concerning the Conservation of Underground Water Resources, and the Protection of the Public Health and
Safety by the Creation of a State Well Drilling Board to Implement Well
Drilling Practices" (Connecticut Public Act No. 659, 1967, General
Session).
2
It should be noted, however, that the formation of ground water
replenishment districts in California involved considerable controversy
and delay. Some of the California experience should be helpful in
Connecticut. See: Robert L. Leonard, "Integrated Management of Ground
and Surface Water in Relation to Water Importation: TmTeExperience of
Los Angeles County" (Giannini Foundation Research Report No. 279,
University of California, Berkeley), October 1964.
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Even after allowing time for construction of storage facilities
and procurement of alternative supplies an absolute rule against any
infringement of protected stream flows could create extreme hardships.
Moreover, an absolute rule probably would not be enforced. In the event
of an actual shortage public water supplies and other economically
valuable uses are not likely to be substantially curtailed in order to
maintain stream flow.

Practical enforcement powers should strongly

encourage the development of storage facilities prior to actual shortages. This encouragement could be provided through a predetermined
system of fines for infringements of protected flows. Of course, the
penalties would have to be sufficiently high to make compliance more
economical than the fine. Penalties should apply to all infringements
without exception.
4.

Impact on water users

In considering the impact of a flow protection policy on water
users it should be noted that restrictions on diversions and detentions
would be increased only to the extent that the protected flow exceeded
obligations based on riparian rights. Thus, the impact would vary
inversely with the extent of existing obligations. The necessity of
actual adjustments in water use or supply would also vary with the
relationship of use to supply. A minor restraint on water management
policies would be the only impact on users with supplies in excess of
actual use. Less fortunate parties could modify use or expand supplies
in a variety of ways. Basic approaches could include: reductions in
use; re-regulation of flow; and development of supplemental supplies.
Choice of method could be left to the individual user.
Reductions in use would probably be the primary method of adjustment
for uses of low economic value. As many farmers do not irrigate forage
crops from available water supplies, there would presumably be little
investment for supplemental supplies by those currently irrigating these
crops. Potential power production at some of the smaller hydroelectric
stations would not warrant investment in afterbays to re-regulate fluctuations in flow. 1 At some of these small stations passing the protected

1
Of the fifteen hydroelectric stations in Connecticut, six have a
generating capacity of 800 kilowatts or less. Source: Fifty-sixth
Annual Report of the Public Utilities Commission, State of Connecticut
(Hartford, 1968), p. 93.
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flow at all times would probably result in either operation only during
seasons of relatively high stream flow or a complete cessation of operation. Manufacturers detaining flow nights and weekends for use during
working hours could reduce detention requirements through increased
recirculation, which would have the external effect of a reduction in
use.
Re-regulation of flow would likely be the most economical approach
for detentions of substantial volume. Afterbays should be as near the
point of use as practical.

Acquisition of needed land and rights-of-way

for developing the most appropriate sites could be difficult in the
absence of condemnation powers. This authority could be created through
an amendment to the existing statutes which provide a form of condemnation power for parties wishing to develop a mill site. 1
Many users requiring supplemental supplies would qualify for assistance under one or more of the numerous federal programs related to water
supply. Both the Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conservation Service
are authorized to provide storage capacities for water supplies in
multiple-purpose projects. Participants in these projects benefit from
the economies of size in construction and from low interest charges.
No interest is charged on the cost of water supply storage until the
supply is first used provided the interest-free period does not exceed
2 The Soil Conservation Service offers technical assistance
ten years.
without charge to farmers planning to expand water supplies. The
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service of the United States
Department of Agriculture pays 50 per cent of construction costs for
farm ponds provided the primary purpose is not to bring additional land
Both loans and grants for water
into production through irrigation.
1

Connecticut General Statutes (Rev. 1958), Sec. 52-446 through 455.

2
For additional information on the authority of the Corps of
Engineers to enter into water supply contracts see: "Water Supply Act
of 1958, Title III of Public Law 85-500," July 3, 1958 (85th Congress,
2nd Session). The Soil Conservation Service has similar authority to
develop water supplies on watersheds up to 250,000 acres in size.
See: "Multiple-Purpose Watershed Projects Under Public Law 566," Soil
Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture (PA-575), May 1963,
13 pp.
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, "Agricultural Conservation Program, Connecticut Handbook
for 1968" (ACP - 1968 - Conn.), March 1968, p. 13.
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supply are also available under numerous federal programs not specifically oriented toward the development of water supplies. 1
A stream flow protection policy would create some rule uncertainty
for the regulated users during the establishment of flow objectives
and sharing agreements.

However, once these policies were established

future adjustments to share with new users would be on the basis of
riparian rights. With an established system rule uncertainty for the
regulated users and physical uncertainty for all users could be held to
a low level through maintenance of rather stable flow protection objectives. While a particular level of flow protection is subject to debate,
at least some regulatory limit on diversions and detentions appears to
be clearly justified.
D. Pollution Control
Pollution control efforts by both the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration and the Water Resources Commission are composed
of three basic parts, determination of water quality objectives, financial assistance, and regulatory activities. The relationships among
these activities are somewhat less direct than might be presupposed.
The regulation of individual waste discharges are usually based on
treatment standards rather than stream quality objectives. Neither
federal nor State regulatory powers are dependent upon the existence of
the cost-sharing programs. However, compliance with regulatory orders
is necessary for receipt of financial assistance.
1. Quali ty objectives
Criteria for setting water quality objectives or standards, and the
role of such standards, have been the subject of considerable debate
since passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1965.2 The
Act requires that quality standards be set for all interstate waters (including coastal waters), and that standards and plans for implementation

1
Office of Economic Opportunity, "Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance" (Information Center of OEO), January 1969, 610 pp.
2

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, op. cit., Sec. 10.
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and enforcement be filed with the Secretary of the Interior. 1 Failure
by a state to comply with the requirements of the Act results in
authority for direct action by the Secretary. Moreover, the Secretary
is responsible for determining if standards comply with the following
cri teri a:
Standards of quality established pursuant to this subsection
shall be such as to protect the public health or welfare,
enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this
Act.
In establishing such standards the Secretary, the Hearing
Board, or the appropriate State authority shall take into
consideration their use and value for public water supplies,
propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and
agricultural, industrial, and other legitimate uses.
Except for an emphasis on enhancement of water quality, the Act gives
little guidance in setting the quality objective for a particular stream.
Additional criteria for establishing water quality standards were
provided by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration. 3 Unfortunately, the two most specific criteria have been of little assistance
in achieving the overall objectives. The guidelines as revised in 1967
specify that no standards providing for less than existing water quality
will be acceptable. 4 A strict enforcement of this requirement would
have, more or less, closed large areas of some states to any urban or
industrial development. Strong reaction against this absolute rule of
no degradation resulted in a progressive softening of the requirement.
On February 8, 1968, the Secretary of the Interior agreed that a lowering
of quality would be permitted if justified to both the state involved and
the Department of the Interior. 5 The requirement of federal approval for
1
When the Act was passed in 1965, the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare was responsible for administration. Authority and responsibility under the Act was shifted to the Secretary of the Interior on
May 10, 1966. Source: "Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1966," Appendix A,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, op. cit., p. 1.
2

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, op. cit., Sec. lO(c)(3), p. 16.

Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, U. S. Department of
the Interior, "Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality Standards for
Interstate Waters" (originally issued May 1966, revised January 1967).
Ibid., item number 1, under Policy Guidelines (pages not numbered).
5
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Newsletter, Water Law, Special Pollution
Control Issue, Vol 11, No. 7, October 1968. (The Water Law Newsletter is
compiled and edited by the Water Law Center, University of Wyoming and
published by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, University of
Colorado, Boulder), p. 2.
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each lowering of quality met strong opposition from many states and
from the United States Chamber of Commerce.
The Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Newsletter reports that "state water quality standards have been
approved which contain statements that high quality waters will not be
lowered in quality unless such change is justified to the state pollution control agency alone. Federal concurrence is not required." 2 The
unrealistic standard of no lowering of quality in the earlier guidelines
may have been a major factor in arousing opposition to federal control
over degradation.
The other specific requirement in the guidelines issued by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration prohibited use of a
stream for the principal purpose of waste disposal. "No standard of
water quality will be approved which provides for the use of any stream
or portion thereof for the sole or principal purpose of transporting
wastes.

"3

Even with improved treatment, waste disposal will continue to
be the principal use of at least sections of some streams. A more realistic perspective would be helpful in planning the location of future
outfalls and in setting standards to protect public health and prevent
nuisances in neighborhoods near the stream sections receiving large
quantities of waste.
Despite the emphasis on stream standards based on potential water
use, much of the actual guidance in setting stream standards seems to
have come from the guidelines relating directly to treatment levels.
No standard will be approved which allows any wastes amenable
to treatment or control to be discharged into any interstate
water without treatment or control regardless of the water
quality criteria and water use or uses adopted. Further, no
standard will be approved which does not require all wastes,
prior to discharge to any interstate water, to receive the
best practicable treatment or control unless it can be demonstrated that a lesser degree of treatment or control will be
provided for water quality commensurate with proposed present
and future water uses .

1

Ibid.

2

Ibid.

3
"Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality Standards for Interstate
Waters," op cit., item number 3 under Policy Guidelines.
4

Ibid., item number 8 under Policy Guidelines.
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In a somewhat indirect manner, practicable treatment generally has been
defined as secondary treatment (approximately 85 per cent removal of
decomposable organic matter and suspended solids) for municipal sewage
and a comparable level of treatment for industrial wastes.
Since the states are required to meet both stream and treatment
standards, and the latter are thee more specific, the federal policy
encourages the states to set target classifications according to quality
conditions expected to result from secondary treatment of waste flows
anticipated in the near future. Quality objectives set for Connecticut
waters appear to have been largely determined by this procedure with
some modification to account for projected uses. 2 The statewide, long
range plan for the management of water resources of Connecticut should
soon provide guidance for modifying quality objectives.

1
At a Senate Hearing, James W. Quigley, Comnissioner, Federal
Water Pollution Control Administration, made the following statement
in response to a question as to whether or not the Department of the
Interior had developed specific minimum standards against which state
standards would be measured:
Senator, as I understand your question, we have not drafted
a set of minimum standards. The Secretary, in his prepared
statement, referred to the National Technical Advisory
Committee on Water Quality Criteria. The Committee's membership is made up of the finest experts in their respective
fields. The Committee's Interim Report commends specific
water quality requirements for various water uses, to guide
the Secretary and to guide us in making our decisions on the
standards submitted by the States.
I think I made the point earlier in answering the chairman's
question that to date the same ten states that we have approved
have all provided for a minimum secondary treatment in municipal
wastes and roughly its equivalent for industrial wastes.
Now, I am not going to sit here and tell you that in all of
the submissions of the remaining 40 states that we will send
to the Secretary, in every instance secondary treatment will
be required. It may not be achieved in some instances; but,
as a general proposition we are trying to achieve this where
we can, when we can.
Water Pollution - 1967 (Part 2). Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Air and Water Pollution of the Comnittee on Public Works, United
States Senate, 90th Congress, August 9 and 10, 1967, p. 548.
2

"Water Quality Standards," State of Connecticut, op. cit.
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2.

Cost-sharing programs

Since passage of Public Act No. 57 in 1967, Connecticut has provided
grants to municipalities for 30 per cent of the cost of constructing
pollution abatement facilities.
The state grant program qualifies
Connecticut communities for the maximum federal grant of 50 per cent
plus an additional ten per cent of the amount of the federal grants for
municipalities participating in regional planning. 2 Thus, most communities can qualify for grants of 85 per cent of the costs of constructing
treatment plants and interceptor lines.
In order to avoid delays due to a shortage of federal funds, the
Secretary of the Interior has been authorized to enter into contracts
with states and municipalities to pay the federal grant over a period of
up to 30 years. Payments under these contracts are for the same items
that would be covered under a grant from current funds; however, the
contract does not include interest on obligations issued by the contracting party. 3 Prefinancing by the State will mean that the State will pay
the interest. Nevertheless, Connecticut has maintained an active grant
program. The $150,000,000 bond authorization in Public Act No. 57 was
increased to $250,000,000 in 1969. 4
Substantial assistance in treating industrial waste is available
only to those industries discharging into a municipal sewage system.
The federal investment tax credit law and the several Connecticut tax
concessions provide some assistance for industrial waste treatment. The
federal investment tax credit law allows firms to deduct from corporate
income tax an amount equal to seven per cent of the capital costs of
buildings and equipment. Investment for air and water pollution control
have been exempted from temporary suspensions of the tax credit law. 5
(Connecticut Public Act No. 57) op. cit, Section 18.
1
Federal Water Pollution Control Act as amended by the Water Quality
2
Improvement Act of 1968 (9th Congress, 2nd Session), Section 8 (b) (7)
and 8 (9).
3

Ibid., Sections 8 (e) and 8 (f).

"An Act Increasing the Bond Issue for Water Pollution Control"
(Connecticut Public Act No. 384, 1969 General Session).
Analysis of the effectiveness of tax credits and other types of tax
concessions see: Mantel, Howard N., et al., Industrial Incentives for
Water Pollution Abatement (a report prepared by the Institute of Public
Ad-inistration, for the Public Health Service, Washington, U. S.
Government Printing Office), February 1965, 95 pp.
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Connecticut allows a credit against the Corporation Business Tax of an
amount equal to the product of the tax rate and the capital cost of
water pollution control facilities.
These tax credit laws assist only
those firms with taxable net income.
Connecticut taxes utilities and unincorporated businesses on the
basis of gross income. Tax credits on these businesses assist economically marginal as well as profitable firms. 2 Buildings and equipment
acquired after July 1, 1965, for treating industrial wastes are exempt
from local property taxation.3 Equipment, supplies, and materials used
in treating industrial wastes are exempt fronm State sales tax. 4
These financial assistance programs provide no direct incentive
to abate pollution. Cost-sharing is effective only when accompanied
by more direct measures such as regulation or effluent charges.
3.

Regulatory powers and procedures

Responsibility for water pollution control is shared by the Water
Resources Commission and the State Department of Health. With an obligation to protect public health, the Department of Health is primarily
concerned with the purity of public water supplies, the safe operation
of sewage treatment plants, the purity of shellfish, and the safety of
public swimming areas. Immediate protection of public health often
involves a restriction of use rather than abatement of pollution. The
objectives and activities of the Department of Health are complementary
to the more comprehensive water quality protection and improvement
program of the Water Resources Commission.
In evaluating the administrative process, Focht concluded that the staffs of the two agencies
have benerally maintained an excellent working relationship. 5
The regulatory powers of the Water Resources Commission were
expanded by Public Act No. 57.

Since May 1, 1967, the Commission may

1

(Connecticut Public Act No. 57), op. cit., Section 29.

2

Ibid., Sections 30-32.

3

Ibid., Section 27.

Ibid., Section 28 and "An Act Concerning the Sales Tax Exemption of
WateroTllution Control Consumables" (Connecticut Public Act No. 188,
1969 General Session).
Focht, op. cit., p. 27.
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issue abatement orders without a formal hearing. 1 Thus, hearings are
necessary only when requested by the alleged polluter. The Cominission
is no longer required to specify a waste treatment method. 2 As Focht
puts it, "Since May 1, 1967, the alleged polluter has the burden of
establishing that the order directing the abatement of pollution should
be revised and modified. This has substantially strengthened the hand
of the Cormission in dealing with the problem of water pollution in this
State.

113

Public Act No. 57 authorized the court to impose a fine of not more
than $1,000 for each knowing violation of any provision of the Act. 4
Each day's continuance of a violation was declared to be a separate and
distinct offense. However, the actual threat of substantial fines was
reduced in 1969 by legislation exempting from penalty violations during
the time when either a hearing or an appeal is pending. 5 Considering the
large investments often required to abate pollution and the fact that
orders can now be issued without a hearing, unwarranted uncertainty could
have been created by making dischargers subject to fines for activities
during the course of hearing procedures.
But the move to reduce uncertainty for alleged polluters may prove excessive. Exempting from penalty
violations continuing during the entire course of appeals may result in
the use of appeal procedures as delaying tactics. The incentive to
appeal just to postpone the expense of abatement could be reduced by
modifying the statutes to permit fines for violations continued during
the course of appeals.

1

Ibid.

Prior to May 1, 1967, the Commission was required to specify one
2
or more systems for abating the pollution and to allow the discharger
to choose among available systems. Orders could not require treatment
involving unreasonable or inequitable cost. Sources: Connecticut General
Statutes (Rev. 1958), Sections 25-1 through 25-24.
3

Focht, op. cit., p. 27.

4

(Connecticut Public Act No. 57) op. cit., Section 17.

5
"An Act Concerning the Forfeitures for Violations of the Water
Pollution Control Statutes" (Connecticut Public Act No. 486, 1969 General
Session).
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4.

Economic incentives

Lack of economic incentives for waste control and treatment is
probably the most serious limitation of the existing pollution control
procedures.

Industries and municipalities have no incentive to propose

plans for treatment beyond the minimum necessary to obtain a permit.
The fact that the Water Resources Commission is no longer required to
suggest a treatment method does not mean that the Commission can now
rely on waste dischargers for information about pollution control techOnly when there is strong opposition to a proposed discharge
can the regulated parties be expected to inform the Commission about new
and more effective abatement techniques which are also more expensive.
Since control of industrial waste should start with process selection,
effective abatement through a regulatory process requires that the
Commission staff keep abreast of current technology in manufacturing
processes. A major administrative effort is also required to check on
niques.

operating policies pertaining to waste control, spillage, clean-up
procedures, and waste treatment.
With little or no incentive to reduce waste discharges beyond levels
required by standards based on known techniques, waste contributors have
little incentive to conduct or support research on pollution abatement.
Treatment problems of most municipalities are sufficiently similar to
utilize the results of a general research effort by universities, government agencies and firms engaged in the manufacture of sewage treatment
supplies and equipment. But control and treatment of many industrial
wastes require more specialized research. The Water Resources Commission
recognized the need for research on industrial waste treatment and has
Research under
sponsored research at Wesleyan and Yale Universities.
of industrial
of
a
number
the
development
has
pioneered
these contracts
waste treatment processes. Research efforts could be stimulated through
advance notice of higher control requirements and through direct economic
incentives.

1
Merwin E. Hupfer, "Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in
Connecticut," a paper presented at the 81st Annual Meeting, Connecticut
Society of Civil Engineers, Inc. (Cheshire, Connecticut, April 22,
1965), (23 pages), p. 9.
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Advance announcement of higher standards:
Research by both waste dischargers and firms producing pollution
control equipment and supplies could be encouraged through advance
announcement of more rigorous standards. In order to maintain credibility, requirements should be realistic and enforcement schedules should
be maintained. Completely unrealistic standards could be avoided by
setting the future requirements just within the limits of current
technology. Industrial and research firms would then have an incentive
to seek more economical methods of compliance. Meanwhile, more basic
research at universities and other publicly-supported agencies and
institutions should generate the basis for higher standards by making
more effective control technically possible. An expectation of rising
standards appears to be the key to encouraging research through a
requlatory program.
Sewage service charges:
An inquiry to several members of the Water Resources Commission
staff about sewage service charges in Connecticut revealed only two
examples of charges based on content of industrial waste. The Town of
Wallingford operates an industrial waste treatment plant in conjunction
with the sewage treatment plant. Four establishments are served by
industrial sewers which receive no sanitary wastes. The four users pay
all operating costs including a reserve for replacement of equipment and
facilities. The cost of chemicals is allocated according to an analysis
by an engineering firm. Subsequent testing for reapportionment is to be
at the expense of the user requesting the review. Costs other than for
chemicals are allocated in proportion to the volume of waste discharged.
The City of New Haven charges one large textile dyeing plant for one
half of the chlorine cost attributable to the firm's waste water. Chlorine cost is estimated on the basis of the decrease in chlorine demand
2
when the plant shuts down annually for a two week vacation period.

Source: Letter and attached data from Vincent A. Maseia,
1
Superintendent, Department of Public Utilities, Water and Sewer Division,
Town of Wallingford, Connecticut, November 14, 1969.
Source: Telephone conversation: Edgar B. Vinal, City Engineer,
2
City of New Haven, Connecticut, October 16, 1969.
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Sewer use ordinances usually limit the concentration of numerous
materials. Unfortunately, these requirements can often be met more
economically by dilution than through control or treatment. In many
municipalities the incentive to dilute rather than treat is reduced
somewhat by sewage service charges based on the volume of water used.
However, a reasonably efficient combination of industrial waste control,
pretreatment at the source, and final treatment at the municipal plant
can be expected only if charges are based on the volume and content
from each major source.
Basically similar principles and procedures for setting sewage
service charges have been recommended in several reports. The most
comprehensive study was made by a joint committee representing eight
national organizations.
The "Joint Committee" report recommends that both capital and
operating costs be divided between current users and property owners.
The capital and maintenance costs of capacity for future growth, infiltration, and storm waters in the case of combined sewers are assigned
to property owners. Benefit assessments and property taxation are the
recommended methods of financing the property-related costs. The report
recommends that costs resulting from use be allocated among users
according to the cost of providing service to each user or group of
users. The cost allocation process involves estimating per unit costs
for volume, suspended solids, biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), chlorine
demand, and other characteristics having an impact on costs of current
use. The unit costs can be applied directly for major industrial dischargers. For sources not large enough to merit individual analysis the
costs associated with quality characteristics can be incorporated into a
charge per unit of volume through the use of average concentrations for
various types of users.
An extensive range of methods and formulas was illustrated as the
result of a survey of industrial waste disposal charges by the American

Committees of the American Society of Civil Engineers and the
Section of Municipal Law of the American Bar Association and Representatives of American Water Works Association, National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners, Municipal Finance Officers Association,
Federation of Sewage Works Associations, American Public Works Association, an Investment Bankers Association of America, "Fundamental
Considerations in Rates and Rate Structures for Water and Sewage Works,"
Ohio State Law Journal, Volume 12, No. 2 (Spring 1951), pp. 151-276.
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Public Works Association.

The survey, which included all cities in the
United States with a population of 5,000 or more, resulted in replies
from 256 cities levying some form of charge for industrial waste. The
charges were based on quality and quantity in 32 cities. In all cases
except one the general approach was to combine a regular charge with a
surcharge for wastes exceeding limits defined for "normal sewage." Fiveday BOD at 20° C., suspended solids, hydrogen ion concentration (pH),
and chlorine demand were the major constituents on which surcharges
were based. 1
Conventional cost accounting procedures are of limited use in
setting charges for wastes which impede the treatment process even when
present in small amounts. While the concentrations of toxic wastes are
usually limited by ordinance, these materials should also be considered
in establishing charges. Operating efficiency can be reduced even by
small concentrations. Moreover, metal wastes become concentrated in
digesters and trickling filters. 2
Assessments for toxic wastes are levied by regional water management
associations in Germany. These regional agencies are responsible for
land drainage, water supply, and stream flow regulation, as well as
pollution control. The perspective of the multiple-purpose agencies in
the Ruhr area is more oriented toward the condition of the stream and the
costs of the entire system than toward the operation and cost of a particular treatment plant. Moreover, use of in-stream oxidation lakes and
conversion of the Emscher into a concrete-lined waste channel with subsequent treatment of the entire dry weather flow have eliminated any clear
definition of sewer, treatment plant, stream and lake. The charges
levied in the Ruhr area combine many of the features normally associated
with both effluent charges and sewer charges.

Viewing the stream and

the treatment plant as an integrated unit has facilitated the use of
a dilution factor in setting charges for toxic wastes. The charge is
based on the cost of providing dilution water required to protect fish.3
1
Public Works Engineers, "Industrial Waste Disposal Charges in Cities
Over 5,000 Population," American Public Works Association, Special Report
No. 18-S (January 1955), pp. 1-70.
2
Masselli, Joseph W., et al., "The Effect of Industrial Wastes on
Sewage Treatment" (1965), A Report for New England Interstate Water
Pollution Control Commission (39 pages), p. 20.
Kneese, op. cit., pp. 176-179.
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Another approach is to combine into a single index the effect of
organic and toxic wastes. The index is a form of population-equivalent
BOD. The conversion of toxic wastes to an equivalent BOD is accomplished
through measuring the extent to which the rate of decomposition of
organic material is reduced by the toxic wastes. The impact of toxic
materials on treatment costs can then be estimated on the basis of the
reduced rate of response to treatment processes. 1
Many sewage treatment plants in Connecticut receive at least some
2
wastes detrimental to biological treatment processes.
Research is
needed to assist municipalities in identifying the costs of receiving
and treating all significant waste components.
Monitoring of volume and content of major sources of industrial
wastes could be done in several ways. The volume of flow could be
measured periodically, metered, continuously measured and recorded, or
estimated from data on plant capacity, type of process and the rate of
water use. Waste content could be determined through periodic analysis,
continuous recording of some characteristics, estimates from engineering
data on the production and treatment processes, or some combination of
these approaches. While a system of charges tends to focus attention on
monitoring requirements, effective monitoring is equally essential for a
rigorous enforcement of quality and flow regulations.
Effluent charges:
Effluent charges would provide the most direct economic incentive
to limit waste discharges into natural waters.
In considering the potential role of charges, a distinction should be made between a system of
charges to supplement regulatory control and a system of charges to limit
waste discharges without dependence on a regulatory program. The latter
approach must be further subdivided into charges based on estimated downstream damages and charges set to achieve specified quality objectives.
Difficulties in attempting to estimate the economic value of downstream costs and losses in satisfaction from particular waste discharges
1

Ibid.

2
"Waste Water Disposal by Connecticut Industries: Inventory as of
January 1, 1961: Compiled for Basic Data Files of the Connecticut Water
Resources Commission," U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Public Health Service, Division of Water Supply and Pollution Control
(Washington, D.C. 1964), 287 pp.
- 57 -

are discussed in Part II of this report. Moreover, restricting public
control to a pricing mechanism would create uncertainty about future
water quality and would create price uncertainty for waste dischargers.
There appears to be no practical way of implementing a pricing system
closely related to the perfectly competitive economic model.
Only one of the above limitations would apply to a system of
charges set to achieve particular quality objectives. Even with stable
objectives there would be serious economic uncertainty for waste
dischargers. For example, consider a situation where three or four
industries were discharging the same type of wastes to a section of a
stream. Expansions in production and in waste discharge by an economically strong firm could force weaker firms entirely out of business.
Conceivably the strong firm might temporarily increase discharges for
the purpose of driving out the other firms. Pricing alone does not
appear to be a feasible method of controlling waste dischargers.
None of the above limitations would apply to the use of effluent
charges in combination with regulation. The two approaches would be
complementary in several ways. A regulatory process tends to focus on
treatment efforts and inputs. Charges would focus directly on results.
Regulation is needed to assure compliance with minimum standards.
Charges would provide a continuous economic incentive to reduce
discharges.
Unfortunately, much of the public discussion about effluent charges
seems to be based on the assumption that charges would be substituted for
regulation. This assumption appears to have been created and promoted
by trade associations opposed to the possible use of effluent charges.
As originally introduced, Senate Bill 2987 contained a provision directing River Basin Commissions to consider the possible use of effluent
charges. 1 The Bill contained no indication that charges would be in lieu
of regulation. Yet opponents based part of their attack on an implicit
assumption that regulations would be abandoned. Consider for example the
following statement:
There are a number of specific objections that should be made
to provisions in S. 2987. We will discuss some of the more
important of them in the comments that follow:

1
Senate Bill 2987, 89th Congress, 2nd session, a bill entitled
"Clean River Restoration Act of 1966," Section 104 (b).
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1. Section 104 (B) directs planning agencies to consider
the possibility of effluent charges. If by an effluent
charge is meant the equivalent of a sewer charge--a fee
for service paid to an agency providing waste treatment,
there can be no objection. But we have serious reservations
about this if it could be interpreted to mean a charge
imposed against a plant according to composition of its
effluent. For one thing, we believe an equitable system
for assessing such charges would be exceedingly difficult
to devise. This obstacle alone would be enough to suggest
that effluent charges of this type should not receive any
endorsement. lie further feel that it would be out of keeping
with the goal of this legislation to say to a business firm
or municipality: "Ifyou want to pour pollutants into the
river, you can pay a fee for this right." The aim should be
to conserve our waters -- not to charge for polluting them. m
Industrial groups using the "license fee to pollute" theme appear to
have had some success in winning the sympathy of conservationists.2
Emphasis by economists on detailed economic models may have indirectly
contributed to the idea that effluent charges would be a substitute
for regulation.
misconception.

A substantial effort may be required to correct this

An effluent charge could be either a service charge or a tax
depending on the relationship to the use of the funds collected and the
associated regulatory policies. Assessments on waste discharges to pay
the cost of augmenting low stream flows would clearly be service charges
if the permitted discharges were related to the flow management program.
Tne rate for each type of waste could be based directly on the cost of
providing the required dilution. A charge not related to the financing
of projects to increase the waste-assimilative capacity of receiving
waters and subsequently to permitted dischargers would be a tax. The
general level of an effluent tax could be set through the legislative
process in the same manner as existing taxes. The relative rates for
various types of waste could be in proportion to dilution ratios needed
to protect aquatic life and to permit specified uses by man.
1
Statement of P. N. Gammelgard, Director of American Petroleum
Institute's Committee on Air and Water Conservation, Water Pollution
Control 1966. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution of the Committee on Public Works, U. S. Senate, Second Session
on S. 2987 et al. (April 19, 20, 26, 27, 28 and May 5, 10, 11, 12, 1966),
[lay 12, 1966, p. 545.
2
Joseph W. Sullivan, "Cleaning Up Dirty Water: Big Spending on Waste
Purification Pushed by Key Lawmakers Bucking Administration," The Wall
Street Journal, Thursday, June 23, 1966, p. 28.
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Opportunities for widespread use of effluent charges directly
related to service provided appear to be limited by two factors.

First,

the federal government already allows costs allocated to flow regulation
for quality protection to be classified as non-reimbursable.

Second,

little information is available on the feasibility of in-stream treatment techniques such as areation and w.iochanical removal of algae.
A nationwide system of effluent faxes would Probably be the most
effective way of cL-r_.i1icaliy encouraginglong run progress in wasto
control and treatmentI.

'ithi
immediate abatelient objectives left

primarily to the regulatory process, the charge rates could be more-orless uniform for all regions. Charges at the same level for all points
of disposal would focus attention incontrol, treatment, and research.
In order to maintain this focus on abatement and research, exceptions to
the principle of uniformity should be li mited to obvious situations such
as the discharge of salt into the open oceans. Uniformity would, also,
minimize opposition stemming from defense of tie existing competitive
position of firms in the same industry.
An effluent charge system should not allow exemptions for the
concentration or quantity of wastes remaining after so-me definition of
' reasonable" treatment.

Exemptions of this type woul-I eliminate the

incentive to develop more effective ways of reducing waste discharges
since tile technical advancement would decrease the exe-ptiol.
tlonitoring requirements for effluent c'harges would be basically
the same as those for a rigorous enforceient of regulatory standards.
IV.

SU2.!MARY

There will be an economic need for a basic redefinition of water
rights in Coinnecticut only if tmhtre is either a substantial increase in
consumptive use or an eventual shortage cf
riparian sites for idustries
nlumes
of water.
requiring latr- v
Lack of rioarian status for public water supDies has not impaired
the development Jf Supplies jy municipalities and privately ownee water
companies. Thie General Asselmbly has beern extremely liberal in 3rantini(
condemnation powers for such purposes. Compensation generally has been
limited to riparians with an established commercial use of the str eam.
Riparian rights have not been effective in protecting recreational
uses and environmental values against losses resulting from waste
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discharges or reductions in flow. Detentions and diversions can create
external costs in much the same way as waste discharges. Public interest
in protecting stream flow is not essentially different from public
interest in controlling water pollution. Empowering the Water Resources
Commission to regulate detentions and diversions would not necessarily
create serious uncertainty for water users.
Present pollution control laws and practices do not include effective economic incentives. More extensive use of sewage service charges
based on flow and content could be helpful in the case of industries
Effluent charges combined with existing
discharging to municipal sewers.
regulatory programs could provide the needed economic incentive without
creating serious uncertainty for either water users or waste dischargers.
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APPENDIX A
REGIONAL WATER QUALITY OPTIMIZATION MODELS
Models developed by Kneese illustrate the conceptual basis for
minimizing costs associated with liquid waste disposal in a region.
The optimization models are first developed under the assumption "....
that there are no efficient quality control measures that cannot be
realized at the individual waste outfall or water supply intake."2
This assumption is useful in focusing attention on the maldistribution
of resources which results from external costs. The models are then
modified to include situations where economies can be realized by
collective treatment, low-flow augmentation, or stream reaeration.
Under the second set of assumptions the responsible regional authority
must have power to plan, finance, construct and operate facilities.
Kneese analyzes three forms of public intervention, which under
his assumptions could cause all external costs to be reflected in waste
disposal decisions. The systems are: effluent charges, incentive
payments, and direct regulations.
Ah1 three systems are dependent
upon schedules of estimated downstream costs associated with various
levels of waste discharge at each possible outfall location under
varying stream flow conditions. In each case the objective is to
minimize the sum of the damage costs and the treatment costs.
Charges model
The effluent charges system can be readily presented only if we
assume that the damage costs are a linear function of the amount of a
pollutant discharged and that the marginal costs of abatement rise as
the abatement level is increased. With linear damage functions the
incremental damage per unit of discharge will be equal to the average

1
Allen V. Kneese, The Economics of Re ional Water Quality Management
(published for Resources for the Future, Inc., by the Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1964), pp. 54-85.
2

Ibid., p. 121.

Charges based on downstream costs had previously been suggested by
Edward F. Renshaw, "Economics of Pollution Control," Sewage and
Industrial Wastes, Volume 30, No. 5, May 1958, pp. 680-688.
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damage per unit of discharge and will not vary with the amount
discharged. Moreover, the damage resulting from a particular discharge
will not be influenced by the amount of the pollutant from other sources.
Thus, for each waste contributor the regional agency can set the charge
per unit of pollutant equal to the associated damage costs. Each waste
contributor can then reduce waste discharges to the point where an additional unit of abatement would be more expensive than the corresponding
effluent charge. The marginal costs of tolerating waste discharges will
be equated to the marginal costs of reducing waste discharges, and the
sum of both types of costs will De minimized.
Economists have generally held that a misallocation of resources
due to external costs can be avoided through the use of charges without
compensating the damaged parties. Kneese concurs with this conclusion
if there are no opportunities for direct negotiation between individual
waste dischargers and those damaged by the discharge. 1 Whipple has
noted that lack of compensation could force financially marginal firms
to suspend operations.2 This type of forced closing could create real
external diseconomies. If so, the value of these "secondary" external
costs would have to be included in the effluent charges for an efficient
allocation of resources without compensation to damaged parties.
A similar problem exists if the levying of an effluent charge
results in the closing of an industry which had been creating real
external net economies. The external diseconomies of closing a plant
in a community with few opportunities for alternative employment are
just as real as the external diseconomies from waste discharges. However, tne purpose of a model is to focus on a set of relationships. All
of the relationships in the economy cannot be considered at once. Thus,
we will proceed to review and analyze regional water quality models
under the assumption tnat all other resources, goods and services are
being efficiently allocated and will be efficiently reallocated in
response to a change in water policy.

Kneese, op. cit., pp. 56-62.

William Whipple, Jr., Economic Basis for iater Resource Analysis
(Water Resources Research Institute, Rutgers, The- State University, New
Brunswick, New Jersey, June 1968, 116 pp.), pp. 95-98.
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If the damage costs are not a linear function of tile quantity of a
particular waste discharged, it is possible to define an increriental
damage function for one discharger only by holding constant the rate of
discharge by others. Thus, the schedule of effluent charges for each
discharger depends on the schedule of charges and corresponding marginal
costs of abatement for the other dischargers.

A theoretical solution

to this dynamic problem has been developed through the use of excess
demand functions.
Unfortunately, the standards defined would become
and remain optimum only when the economy reaches and maintains a steady
state of growth.2
Payments model
In an optimization model based on payments, a regional agency
would stand ready to pay all potential waste contributors to restrict
waste discharges. The schedule of payments offered to each potential
waste contributor would be based on the incremental damage costs
associated with the potential discharge. 3
A major debate has arisen over whether or not a payment model can
4
The two approaches
be theoretically symmetrical to a charges model.
are basically very different with regard to the information needed by
an implementing agency. With a charges system the regional authority
would levy the assessment on each unit of waste discharged. With a
payments system the total payment to a potential waste contributor would
depend upon the amount which would have been discharged in the absence
of the payment less the amount actually discharged. Estimating the
amount that would be discharged in the absence of the payment would

Gardner, Brown, Jr., and Brian Mar, "Dynamic Economi-ic Efficiency
of Water Quality Standards or Charges," Water Resources Research, Volume
4, No. 6, December 1968, pp. 1153-1159.
2

Ibid., p. 1159.

3

Kneese, op. cit., pp. 56-62.

For additional information on this question and reference to
several recent journal articles see: Allen V. Kneese and Blair T. Bower,
Managing Wlater Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions (published
for Resources for the Future, Inc., by the Johns Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, 1968, 328 pp.), pp. 101-109.
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become increasingly complex as cost and revenue functions shift through
ti me.

An attempt to utilize the payments technique would involve severe
administrative limitations. Waste contributors would have an incentive
to adopt, or threaten to adopt, processes which generate much waste in
order to be able to collect payments for restricting waste discharges.
Payments would have to continue to a firm which left the basin as a
means of reducing waste discharges.

Moreover, payments would have to

be made to potential dischargers which would have located in the basin

the absence of the payment.
Effluent standards
The sum of abatement and damage costs could be minimized through
effluent standards if
the marginal

a regional authority had complete information on

costs of abatement for each discharger in addition to

the information needed for an ideal system of charges.

2

The optimum

quantity of waste discharge at each outfall location for each level of
stream flow could be determined by equating the marginal damage function
to the marginal costs of abatement.

Assuming no negotiations between

private parties the discharge at each outfall would, in the short run,
be the same as with an optimum set of charges. 3

1
M. J. Kamien, N. L. Schwartz, and F. T. Dolbear, Jr., "Asymmnetry
Between Bribes and Charges," Water Resources Research, Volume 2, No. 1,
First Quarter, 1966, pp. 147-157.
2

Kneese, op.

cit., pp.

82-83.

Through time the two systems would not have the same influence on

industry location, Ibid., p. 83.
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APPENDIX B
CONNECTICUT PUBLIC ACT NO. 792, 1967 GEINERAL SESSION
AN ACT CONCERNING USE OF WATER FROl' RIVERS
FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION
Section 1.

Any town, city, borough or corporation authorized by law

to supply pure water for public or domestic use shall have the power to
divert and use water from any river for public or domestic use after
making written application for and obtaining a permit frorn the water
resources commission. The application shall include any information
the commission requires and, if the granting of such a permit would
affect the rights of any public service company, the application shall
include either: The written consent of such company for such diversion
or use; or an order from the public utilities coimission giving its
approval for such diversion or use and awarding such compensation, if
any, to such public service company as it deems equitable. The power
herein granted shall be in addition to any power granted by special act
to any specially chartered corporation. but power to divert and use
water granted by special act after Janrarj 1, 1967, to any such corporation shall be exercised only in accordance with the provisions of this
act.
Sec. 2. The water resources comrlission, upon receipt of an application under section 1 of this act, snall (1) make such investigation as
the commrission deems necessary; (2) make a determination based on
findings that such diversion and use is reasonably necessary and will
not interfere with navigation; (3) advise, consult and cooperate with
other appropriate state agencies, including the state departmrent of
health and state board of fisheries and gam:e; and (4) hold a public
hearing, after reasonable notice, at which any person whio may be
directly or indirectly affected by the deter.ination of the coii-ission
with respect to such application shall be entitled to be heard, in
person or by counsel.
Sec. 3. Any permit issued by the water resources commission pursuant
to the provisions of this act may be revoked or modified in any manner
by the commission if the commission finds it in the public interest to
do so. Factors affecting the public interest, as the term is used in
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this section,

saidll include but nut be li,.ited tu chaanres in conditions

uwater resources of tie state or any river from which such
watcr is diverted and used. If tre coumission finds that an emergency
affcctinl

troe

exists wliich is causing permanent dainage to tie public interest, it
may revoke or modify any such perilit without hearing. Alny appeal by
any town, city, borough or corporation aggrieved by the doings of the
comnlission because of such emergency revocation or modification shall
not stay the order of the comlission. If no such emergency exists the
comi-imission, prior to revoking, modifying or changing such permit, shall
hold a public hearing after reasonable notice; make such investigation
as it deems necessary; and make a determination based on findings that
the public interest requires such revocation or modification.
Sec. 4. Any town, city, borough, corporation or person aggreived by
any order or authorization or decision of the commission under this act
may appeal therefrom to the superior court as provided for in sections
16-35 to 16-38, inclusive, of the general statutes.
Sec. 5. In any case in which the law requires compensation to be
made to any persons whose rights, interest or property are injuriously
affected by any order of the water resources commission under this act,
such person may apply to the superior court for the appointment of a
committee to determine and award the amount to be paid by such town,
city, borough or corporation.
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